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INTRODUCTION

Varieties of aggressive and improper forms of economic activity
have existed as threats to civil order since at least biblical times.'
From this historical perspective, the capacity of some individuals to
generate the destructive impact of "merger mania! 2 run amok hardly
seems shocking.3 Yet there is something profoundly threatening to
civil order4 whenever a cabal of conspirators can, in the name of
greed or avarice alone,5 destroy the lives and jobs of tens of thousands of individuals. 6 However, civil society rarely allows itself to

1. Exodus 21:37 (stating that "[w]hen a man steals an ox or a sheep and slaughters or
sells it, he shall restore five oxen for the one ox, and four sheep for the one sheep"). The
redress of anti-social behavior with punitive damages in addition to compensation were "for
example's sake, to prevent such offences in future." Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 NJ.L. 77 (1791).
2. Rosabeth M. Kanter & Tobias K. Seggerman, Managing Mergers, Acquisitions, and
Divestitures, MGifT. REV., Oct. 1986, at 16 (stating that over 3,000 mergers took place in
1985). See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., LAYOFFS, PLANT CLOSINGS AND CONCESSION BARGAINING-BNA's SUMMARY REP. FOR 1982, at 3 (1983) (during 1982 more than 1.2 million workers were placed on either temporary or permanent layoff in more than 2,700 separate incidents, 600 of which were permanent plant shutdowns affecting more than 215,000 workers).
3. See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL (1988) (giving an overview). For a
contrary, and felonious, view that unbridled greed is good, see IVAN BOESKY, MERGER MANIA (Jeffrey Madrick ed., 1985); ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER 132-33 (1987)
(quoting Boesky's 1985 Berkeley commencement address, "Greed is all right, by the way. I
want you to know that. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good
about yourself.").
4. If society cannot guarantee order in the sense of equal security of person and property, and facilitate long term investments in jobs and businesses - impairments of the obligations of contracts, cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 - the authority of the law will suffer
irreparably. HENRY S. MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 247-48 (1885) (referring to the contract
clause as "the bulwark of American individualism against democratic impatience and socialistic fantasy").
5. Such widespread social violence is not unprecedented. See, Allan Kanner, Emerging
Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERS LJ. 343, 346
(1987) (referring, inter alia, to the carnage among asbestos and BCME workers, Dalkon
Shield users, and the people of Bhopal, India).
6. Even if a merger or takeover fails to materialize, severe human costs and repercussions can still occur. For example, the Revlon Group's well-publicized attempt to take over
the Gillette Company led to a major restructuring program to keep future raiders at bay.
Gillette laid off 2,400 employees, sold off several marginal businesses, wrote off $205 million
in termination costs and operating losses, and more than doubled its long-term debt to $1 billion in a "poison pill" attempt to make the fin less attractive to potential acquirers. Alex
Beam, For Gillette, Life not the Same After Arrival of Perelman, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19,
1987, at 69. Unfortunately, such radical efforts may not save the independent company.
Gillette continued to be a takeover target as Revlon persisted in its advances and Coniston
Partners, a New York-based investment firm, has also gotten into the act. Alex Beam, Gillette
a Takeover Target for the Fourth Time in 2 Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1988, at 1, 69.
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fall prey to such misconduct for long.
A fundamental tenet of social life is that one may not harm
another without some justification or consent.' Thus, if an otherwise
permissible activity of everyday life gives rise to a harm, the responsible party must still remedy that unjustified harm.' Compensation for
these harms is the traditional province of tort law.9
From time to time, government has added or substituted remedies
available to the individual.'0 In addition, the underlying harm-creating conduct may be deemed significant enough to warrant government
civil or criminal sanctions, but these sanctions are generally additive
and do not interfere with the individual's right to pursue a tort compensation remedy."
These basic tenets are constantly being reapplied as life in civil
society changes - as we move from agrarian to industrial to petrochemical modes of production - and as our understanding of that
social life"3 and our roles therein grow." Such changes and growth
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
7. JOHN S. MnIL, ON LIBERTY (1859). This is similar to saying that "[lI]aw is something more than mere will exerted as an act of power ....
Arbitrary power, enforcing its
edicts to the injury of the persons and property [of the citizenry], is not law." Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884).
8. For example, governmental permission to allow a nuclear power plant to operate and
emit airborne pollutants does not preclude a tort suit. Thus, tort claims for compensatory
damages and punitive damages are generally different from, and not preempted by, federal
regulations. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 202, 203,
222-23 (1983); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
9. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (stating that it is the function of the common law
'to protect the weak from the infults [sic] of the stronger"). See Allan Kanner, Emerging
Conceptions of Latent Personal Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 343
(1987).
10. New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Seres., 445
A.2d 704, 713 (NJ. 1982) (quoting Judge Pashman stating "[i]n this State, we do not set
people adrift because they are the victims of misfortune. We take care of each other").
11. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988) (stating that there is no preemption of tort remedies provided by federal securities laws); see infra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
12. E-g., Allan Kanner, Future Trends in Toxic Tort Litigation, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 667,
n.1 (1989).
13. !g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
LJ. 704 (1931) (stating that the system of "free" contract described by nineteenth century
theory is now coming to be recognized as a world of fantasy, too orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to correspond with reality. With new vision has come a more
conscious and sustained effort to select the forms of permissible pressure and to control the
manner of its exercise); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631 (1943) (acknowledging the fact that
individuals lack bargaining power in mass production society).
14. E-g., Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of
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create new types of harm, which in turn moves the law's development forward. t5
The junk bond funded hostile takeover is perhaps the most
shocking economic development in recent times. 6 Although mergers
and acquisitions are not new, 7 the potential for harm created by the
junk bond is novel.1 8 From 1975 to 1980 there were approximately
13,000 mergers and acquisitions, with an estimated value of $175
billion. 9 While the rate of mergers continued unabated during the
Problems and Potentials, 4 J. CONa. CORP. L. & SEC. REo. 155, 170 (1982) ("[IThe corporation is more than the shareholders and includes the employees. ... Indeed, the employees
may have made a much greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service, may
have much less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise than many of the stockholders.").
15. As Brandeis told a Senate committee investigating business practices in 1911, there
was serious danger of social unrest in "letting the people learn that our sacred Constitution
protects not only vested rights but vested wrongs." Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the Senate, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 1166 (1911); see Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 354, 368 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16. Essentially, "junk bonds" are bonds rated at below "investment grade" by the two
principal bond-rating agencies (Moody's or Standard & Poor's). Such bonds pay a correspondingly high interest rate, with current rates equaling 16% or more. Prior to 1976, no
well-known investment banking house would underwrite the original issue of such low-rated
bonds, but in that year Drexel Burnham Lambert, which had previously made a secondary
market in these bonds, began also to underwrite them. The use of junk bonds to finance
takeovers apparently dates from the 'latter part of 1983." See Congressional Research Service
for the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, The Role of High Yield Bonds [Junk Bonds] In Capital
Markets and Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications, 99 Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1985).
[hereinafter Congressional Research Service Report]. The significance of the junk bond's
appearance is twofold: First, bidders, such as Boone Pickens, Victor Posner, Saul Steinberg,
or Pantry Pride (all of whom have financed tender offers through Drexel Burnham), previously had difficulty in obtaining credit from banks, some of whom have refused to finance
"raiders" as a matter of policy. Second, commercial banks have traditionally followed conservative lending policies and have seldom been willing to finance more than 50% of the
acquisition cost of a target. Bidders were compelled to incur additional debt that was subordinated to their own loans because from the standpoint of these banks such subordinated debt
is the equivalent of equity. Thus, a bidder who can issue subordinated junk bonds (at a high
interest rate) after first
borrowing from commercial lenders (at a lower rate) can finance as
much as 90% of the acquisition cost. This fact explains much about the newfound ability of
small bidders to tender for much larger targets.
17. United States industrial history has been marked by four great merger or acquisition
waves. The frst began late in the 19th century and peaked in 1901; a second, milder episode
occurred during the late 1920's; the third peaked in 1968, and the fourth, which continues as
this Article is being written, began to flourish in the early 1980's. See DAVID RAVENSCRAFT
& FREDEtucK SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 21-22 (1987).
18. A description of this new form of takeover financing is contained in a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. See
Congressional Research Service Report, supra note 16, at 4.
19. Robert Pear, Clarifying Some Mixed Signals on Antitrust, N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 1981,
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1980's, the estimated dollar value rose dramatically. The year 1984
witnessed more than 2,500 deals, worth $122 billion. 20 In 1985,
more than 3,000 mergers and acquisitions were announced, with a
total value of $180 billion.21 In 1986, there were more than 4,200
mergers among U.S. firms, involving almost $200 billion. In the first
quarter of 1987 alone, z2 936 mergers and acquisitions were reported,
involving almost $32 billion.'
The magnitude of the adverse impact on workers caused by this
merger mania was at first masked by Wall Street's claim that such
ravages represented a short-term downturn prior to the emergence of a
leaner, meaner and full employment economy.24 Wall Street asked us
to believe that as bad as everything seemed in terms of lost jobs, in
reality, everything was really good.' As it turned out, Wall Street
made money, workers lost jobs, long term investments dried up, research and development began to disappear, and communities suffered.26

at E4 (relying on W.T. Grim & Company data).
20. Steven E. Prokesch & William J. Powell, Jr, Do Mergers Really Work?, BUS. WK.,
June 3, 1985, at 88.
21. Kanter & Seggerman, supra note 2.
22. In 1987 preliminary estimates of the job losses at several acquisition targets were
reported to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. In the deal that
created the company now known as Unisys, Burroughs Corp.'s hostile bid for Sperry Corporation purportedly cost 9,600 jobs. Hostile Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1987) (including a letter
of Robert E. Mercer, Chairman of the Board, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., dated April 17,
1987) [hereinafter Senate 1987 Takeover Hearings]. The post-bid leveraged buyout of Safeway
by an investor group put 3,500 employees out of work. Id. After Midcon was subjected to a
hostile bid, Occidental Petroleum acquired it and phased out 2,000 jobs with plans to cut
1,000 more. Id. After acquiring American Hospital Supply, Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
established a four-year schedule to eliminate 6,500 jobs. Id. Finally, T. Boone Pickens' unsuccessful hostile bid for Gulf Oil precipitated Socal's acquisition of Gulf. The resulting company, Chevron Corp., cut its workforce from 79,000 immediately following the merger to
52,000 in June 1986. Id.
23. Quarterly Profile, MERGERS & ACQTISMONS July-Aug. (1987).
24. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS BALL (1988); Takeover: The Market Test, WALL
ST. I., June 5, 1985, at 30, col. I (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIAuSM
AND DEMOCRACY 83-84 (1975)) (emphasis added); see The Delaware Tilt, WALL ST. J., Juno
12, 1985, at 30, col. 1; see also Abuses, Real and Imagined, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1985, at
22, col. 1 (arguing that takeovers add to economic wealth and should not be heavily regulated by Congress).
25. See Arthur Burck, The Hidden Trauma of Merger Mania, BUS. WK., Dec. 6, 1982,
at 14.
26. In criticizing the takeover process, labor representatives have presented numerous
takeover-induced layoffs. The AFL-CIO suggests that Safeway's job dislocations actually were
as high as 9,500. Senate 1987 Takeover Hearings, supra note 22, at 536 (including a written
submission by Thomas R. Donahue. AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer). Lucky Stores' successful
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A TRIP To FANTASYLAND

The reality of lost jobs, economic dislocation and human suffering was coyly hidden beneath the imagery, excitement and military
jingoism that hostile takeovers brought, first, to the formerly staid
confines of Wall Street, and, later, to the rest of America. Wall Street
"raiders, 27 "arbs'28 and "white knights 29 scoured the land in
search of huge fees, profits and "crown jewels"3 that come from
putting "targets" "in play" where their "bloodied" remains are fought
over with an array of tactics, including "lock ups," 31 "poisoned
pills," 32 "tender offers," 33 "shark repellents,"
"prisoner's dilem-

defense against a raid by Asher Edelman resulted in the closing of its Gemco stores in the
western United States, costing 6,000 jobs and causing another 8,000 workers to transfer to
other Lucky operations. The AFL-CIO estimates 25,500 jobs lost in the textile and clothing
industries because of takeovers. Id. Owens-Coming Fibreglass cut thousands of jobs as a
result of a hostile takeover. Id.; see Jane Von Bergen, In Unprecedented Case, Workers Sue
Raider Over Lost Jobs, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 25, 1988, at B1, col. 1. Diamond

Bathhurts, a glass products manufacturing firm, acquired 3 other glass firms in the early
1980's and by 1984 had a total of 22 plants with nearly 8,000 employees. Senate 1987
Takeover Hearings, supra note 22, at 537. "It closed eight of those plants and now employs
4,000." Id. Goodyear Rubber Co. eliminated 2,000 jobs after fighting off Sir James
Goldsmith's hostile bid by a share buyback. Id. See Corporate Raider Goldsmith Leaves
Goodyear in Shambles, SAN DIEGO UNION, Nov. 30, 1986, at 1-7.
27. Michael Jensen, Takeovers. Folklore and Science, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 109

(1984).
28. "Arbs" engage in "risk arbitrage," or the investment in stocks on the basis of presumed price rises caused by impending mergers and acquisition. 1. BOESKY, MERGER MANIA
(1985).
29. E.g., Clifford Holdemess, et al., Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985); see Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,

365 (2d Cir. 1980).
30.

E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).

31. Id.; see MOIRA

JOHNSTON, THE NEW WALL STREET WARRIORS 314-15 (1987); Vic-

tor M. Rosenzweig, The Legality of "Lock-Ups", 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 299 (1983).
32. The term "poison pill" describes rights or warrants granted to shareholders by a
target company that become exercisable if a raider obtains a specified percentage of the
target's shares and is designed to have unpalatable consequences to the raider. See Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (noting that the
board of directors has power to adopt a "poison pill" defense in response to a hostile takeover bid); Suzzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUs. LAW. 747
(1987).
33. E.g., DORMAN L. COMMONS, TENDER OFFER 2-5 (1986). The "any-and-all bid" is an
offer to buy all shares tendered to the raider by specified date. HOPE LAMPERT, TILL DEATH
Do US PART - BENDIX VS. MARTIN MARmETTA 93 (1983).
34. Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, Shark Repellents: The Role and Impact of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

1 83,714 (Sept. 1984); Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, A Study on the Economics of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

7

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
[Vol. 10:1

Hofstra Labor Law Journal
' 35

"bear hugs," 36 "Pac-Man"
"golden parachutes. 39
mas,

The "players"

-

defenses,

37

"greenmail ' '3'

raiders, arbs, targets and white knights -

and
even

developed special, if not sociopathic, monikers for themselves as they
traveled through this fantasyland. War-like and military names are
preferred for the raiders.40 For example, two "raiders," Sanford
Sigoloff and Irwin Jacobs, refer to themselves as "Ming the Merciless"41 and "Irv the Liquidator,"42 respectively. Neither is as feared
as the arb "Ivan the Terrible" was before he went to prison. 3 Their
lawyers are known as "field marshals or war ministers," 44 while their
investment bankers are described as being like "platoon leader[s] on a
beachhead." 5

Poison Pills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 971 (Mar. 5, 1986).
35. The "prisoner's dilemma" refers to the coercive nature of two-tier tender offer
"which contemplates that even though the shareholders as a group would be better off by not
tendering, the coercive nature of tender offers tends to compel individual shareholders to
tender anyway." William Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of
Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 1003 (1983).
36. Eg., JEFFREY MADRICK, TAKING AMERiCA 111 (1987) (defining "bear hug" as
squeezing management into submission by offering management a premium price for shares).
37. The "Pac-Man" defense is a tender offer by the subject company for the securities
of the original bidder. Deborah A. DeMott, Pac-Man Tender Offers, 1983 DUKE L.J. 116.
See also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (discussing
the Pac-Man defense).
38. E.g., Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII)
83713 (Sept. 11, 1984); Nancy A. Lester-Lawson, Comment, Greenmail: Is It Just Passing
the Buck? 6 PACE L. REv. 69, 75-76 (1985); Heckman v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177
(Cal. CL App. 1985) (discussing the Steinberg Greenmail in Disney case).
39. A "golden parachute" is a generous severance package that protects certain key executives if control of their company changes. See Joseph F. Haggerty, Note, Golden Parachute
Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 516 (1983); Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive
Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCr. & EcON. 178, 179-204 (1985); Kenneth C. Johnsen, Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward A Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909 (1985).
40. Jensen, supra note 27, at 112.
41. See Stephen J. Sansweet & David J. Jefferson, Sigoloff's Stewardship of Wickes Cos.
in Questioned, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1988, at A8.
42.

See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS BALL (1988).

43.

Id. (referring to Ivan Boesky); see also supra note 3.

44.

RiCHARD PHALON, THE TAKEOVER BARONS OF WALL STREET 167-68 (1981).

45. Id. at 71 ("It's just like being in combat."); see also ARTHUR FLEISCHER ET AL.,
BOARD GAMES 7 (1988) ("And a takeover, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, is 'no drill.'");
but see Bryan Burrough, Top Deal Maker Leaves a Trail of Deception In Wall Street Rise,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1990 at A-1, A-6 (stating that "[m]ilitary phrases dotted his jargon:
'Lock and load!' Mr. Beck was prone to shout before an important meeting. [Jeffrey Beck]
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It may well be that this language was less a smokescreen to
those who wished to penetrate what was going on than it was a reflection of the psychoses suffered by the "players."46 It has been
argued that when one large business attempts to take over another,
the language in which this is conducted reflects all the emotions,
fears, and joys that one should expect to find when the consequences
of winning and losing are so great. This is the only way to cope with
the intense emotion involved. Indeed, one of the fundamental purposes of language is that it helps to insulate both parties, taker and
takee, from the intensity of their emotions:
The takeover event in itself clearly conforms to a predictable set of
scenarios or scripts. In the most neutral terms, this boils down to:
Offer -

decisions/actions taken -

outcome [that is, if takeovers

were expressed solely in the impersonal language of economics]. In
the business world, this relatively simple diagram has taken on the
far more colorful forms available from such well known popular
genres as the westem (ambush and shootout replace [the more bland
terms] offer and actions taken), the love affair and/or marriage,
warfare (replete with sieges, barricades, flak, and soldierly honor),
mystery, and piracy on the high seas (with raiders and safe' harbors). Generic formulations also entail the frequent appearance of
mercenaries or hired guns (investment houses to whom most of the
negotiating is delegated), and black and white knights (culled from
tales of chivalry in which the distressed damsel is either undone or
rescued). In virtually all formulations, the acquiring executive is
macho and the target company [i.e., the organization that is being
sought to be acquired] is accorded the female gender ("sleeping
beauty" or a bride brought to the altar, reference to rape also is not
uncommon).4 7
As Ming the Merciless admitted, new language was an important
part of the "greed and moral laxity" at play:
We needed a new business vocabulary that reflected the decade's

acquired the "Mad Dog" sobriquet from his troops").
46. See PAUL HIRscH & JOHN A.Y. ANDREWS, AMBUSHES, SHOOTOUTS, AND KNIGHTS
OF THE RoUNDTABLE: THE LANGUAGE OF CORPORATE TAKEOvERS 150-51 (Louis R. Pondy
et al.eds., 1983).
47. Id. at 148; see also UAN I. MrOFF & ILH. KILMAN, CORPORATE TRAGEDIES 113
(1984) ("Thus, archetypal images not only exist in general, but even more important and
interesting, they exert their influence in an arena where the uninitiated or the psychologically
unsophisticated would least expect to find them, the 'seemingly' all-too-practical world of
business.").
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green and moral laxity; terms that emerged from the financial
heights and pits, including raider, entrenched management, manage-

ment buyout, leveraged buyouts, risk arbitrage, junk bonds, vultures,
white knights, squires, strips, PIKS, fraudulent conveyance, default

rate, and turnaround. Our genius for creating acronyms like DINK
(double income no kids), NIMBY (not in my back yard), and
MEGO8 (my eyes glazed over) added to the babblespeak of the
4

times.

Lawyers and investment bankers may well be criticized for pandering to these delusions, and other sorts of Raider hysteria and
"greed run-amok."49 In any event, it is no accident that they call it
"merger mania" '
Outsider challenges to corporate management characteristically take
on the dimensions of warfare. Battles are waged by proxy, in the
courts and in the press. Military and Arthurian metaphors are ap-

plied to the various actors and their maneuvers. The costs, both
public and private, are tremendous."'
FANTASYLAND'S ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE REST OF US

The linguistic imagery of hostile takeovers 2 constituted a fantasy world of exaggerated claims, omnivorous appetites, pathological

48. WoRKouTs AND TURNAROUNDS, THE HANDBOOK OF RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTING
IN DIsTRESsED COMPANIES 1-2 (Dominic DiNapoli et al. eds., 1990), from Sanford Sigoloff
Introduction.
49. E.g., CoNNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 204 (1988):
During the course of the Revlon battle, [Lawyer Marty] Lipton would be moved to
new heights, firing off to his corporate clients a memo entitled "Rape and Pillage
in the Corporate Takeover Jungle": "This year has witnessed the demise of the few
remaining restraints on corporate raiders. They have been let loose to take over
and bust up American corporations at will ...
l
50. IvAN F. BOESKY, MERGER MANIA (1985). Mergers go back at least to the turn of
the century. See PETER 0. STENER, MERGERS 1-6 (1975). However, the recent wave of junk
bond financed mergers are different because of the reliance on debt.
51. Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 347 (D.N.J. 1985) (Sarokin, J.); see 1
MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FAEEZEOUTs v-vi (1978); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the
Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 775-76 (1982); Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents and Hostile Tendor Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 155 (1986).
52. Cf. Ronald D'Avis, Note, Liability for Greenmailers: A Tort Is Born, 19 IND. L.
REV. 761 (1986) (suggesting that such imagery creates an "aura of fantasy" surrounding hostile takeovers).
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rhetoric, and criminal misconduct.5 3 This fantasyland masked, and
often still masks, the ugly reality of the "devastating effects" imposed
upon the average American worker, and society as a whole, when
plants are forced to close."' These takeovers are effecting a massive
redistribution of wealth in the form of lost jobs for workers, especially in those companies Wall Street finds to be "undervalued," to a
newly emerging Wall Street elite that makes fortunes in facilitating
transactions of dubious, general economic worth.
Although tens of thousands of jobs have been lost,55 Congress
has not stepped in forcefully enough to regulate the field. 6 The average American does not benefit from this massive and unprecedented
redistribution of wealth.57 Indeed, much of this redistribution arises
from, or at least has been tainted by, criminal misconduct." More
ominously, the current merger mania will adversely affect the long
term competitiveness of American industry 9 in the world' and its

53. Bryan Burrough, The Party's Over - Proxy King Don Carter Eyes Prison Stint For
Theft, Tax Evasion - He Transformed Takeovers, Led Life of Excess, Turned To Crime, He
Now Admits - Another Casualty of the '80s, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1990, at A-1.
54. Not only are jobs lost, but it takes longer for a worker who loses his or her job
due to a plant closing to find a new job, on average; and when a new job is obtained, it
tends to be lower paying, less skilled, and frequently only part time. LAWRENCE E.
ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLmCS, AND WORKERS 14-15 (1986).
55. One to two additional jobs are indirectly lost in a local economy for every one job
directly lost due to the closing of a major local employer, such as an automobile plant.
BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 71
(1982).
56. See Richard G. Swanson, S. 510 and The Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George From the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 431 (1968).
57. Cf. DANIEL WEBSTER, JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION
OF DELEGATES CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETrs, NOVEMBER 15,
would not
1820 - JANUARY 9, 1821 144 (1821) (stating that "[t]he freest government ...
long be acceptable, if the tendency of the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless.
In such a case, the popular power must break in on the rights of property, or else the influence of property must limit and control the exercise of popular").
58. E.g., MARK STEVENS, THE INSIDERS (1987) (discussing, inter alia, criminal cases
against Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, Paul Thayer, Martin Siegel, Ira Sokolow, Giuseppe
Tome); R. FOSTER WINANS, TRADING SECRETS (1986) (chronicling the insider trading scandal
between R. Foster Winans of the Wall Street Journal, and Peter N. Brant, a.ka. Peter Noel
Bornstein, of Kidder, Peabody & Co.).
59. For example, Wall Street targets "undervalued" companies with large financial commitments to research and development. The debt resulting from the takeover battle, and the
need to service it with current cash flow, negatively impacts on future research. See JOHN
BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 19 (1988).
60. Peter F. Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeover, WALL ST. J. Oct. 30, 1984, at
A30 (indicating that management's fear of being taken over is the "main cause of the decline
in America's competitive strength in the world economy").
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ability to withstand the inevitable ups-and-downs of the marketplace.6
A growing number of studies show that mergers fail to lead to
positive performance outcomes,62 that acquiring firms often perform
more poorly than nonacquiring firms, 63 that both conglomerate mergers and horizontal acquisitions can lead to substantial losses in market
share,' that mergers do not reliably yield the desired financial returns, 65 and that most firms experience significant difficulties during
the post-merger integration period.'
The junk bond, which is a publicly registered noninvestment
grade subordinated debt, fueled this dramatic increase in acquisitions,
recapitalizations and leveraged buyouts. Strangely, the emergence of
the junk bond market gave companies with bad credit - i.e., that
lacked investment grade debt ratings - access to a public capital
pool aggregating more than $200 billion. In other words, economic
power went to those who could not qualify for capital investment
through traditional lending resources.67 Accordingly, the problems

61.

Christopher Farrell, Learning to Live with Leverage, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988,

at 138.

62. Paul Halpern, Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of
Event Studies Applied to Acquisitions, 38 J. FIN. 2, 297-318 (1983).

63. William D. Bradford, Savings and Loan Association Mergers: Analysis of Recent
Experience, 13 REV. BUS. & ECON. RES. 1, 1-18 (Fall 1977).
64. Dennis C. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 259,
259-67 (1985).
65. Michael Lubatkin & Hugh M. O'Neill, Merger Strategies and Capital Market Risk,
30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 665, 665-84 (1987).
66. William L Powell, Jr. & Steven E. Prokesch, Do Mergers Really Work7, BUS. WK.,
June 3, 1985, at 88-100.
67. In late 1985, by a 3-2 vote, the Federal Reserve Board announced a proposed restriction on the use of junk bonds issued by "shell corporations" to finance takeovers. Effectively, the Federal Reserve's action means that debt securities issued by such shell corporations might not be issued to finance more than 50% of the purchase price in a takeover.
Procedurally, the Federal Reserve Board established a presumption that debt securities issued
by a shell corporation were "indirectly secured" by the target's stock when no other credit or

assets were pledged. However, the Board defined "shell corporation" narrowly as one having
"virtually no business operations, no significant business function other than to acquire and
hold the shares of the target company, and substantially no assets or cash flow to support the
credit other than the margin stock it has acquired or intends to acquire." See Interpretation of
Margin Requirements, 72 FED. RESERVE BULL., 192 (Number 3 Mar. 1986). Given this definition, the professional reaction to the Federal Reserve Board's ruling was that creative planning by bidders could overcome this presumption, particularly if other security for the loan
(such as a guarantee by those who stood behind the shell corporation) also pledged. See
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Federal Reserve Votes for Limits On Debt Financing of Takeovers,
N.Y. TIMlO, Dec. 7, 1985, at 1, 36. Modest as the proposal was, it still elicited a sharply
critical response from the Reagan administration, which saw it as unnecessary intervention in
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caused by these Raiders should hardly be surprising. 8
THE HUMAN IMPACT

The personal impact of hostile takeovers on workers and their
families is devastating.69 From suicides to shattered dreams, from
workers to their families and communities, the violence often wrought
by corporate raiders is immense and pervasive:
"Don't go down the cellar," Chris Donahue's suicide note warned
his family. That's where the thirty-eight-year-old economist hanged
himself recently, four days after he lost his $63,000-a-year job at

Heublein, Inc., following a takeover by R.J. Reynolds Industries. A
week earlier, he thought he'd been promised an auspicious Reynolds
headquarters job. Instead, he got eleven weeks' severance pay. "Tell
someone at RJR that I loved their generosity and compassion," his
note continues. "They owed me more ....
I know you will think I
failed, and maybe I did ....
I didn't have the strength to endure
the pain that was coming." 0
"I worked for 18 years and gave them everything I had. Look how
I end up, just like a run-over flat can in the street. There is no

loyalty, no commitment, no feeling. When it got tough, they bailed
out and let us sink [in a hostile acquisition]." 7

Few things are as basic to the individual as his or her ability to
earn a livelihood, to achieve security and to provide for loved ones.
"Merger mania" tramples these basic needs, except for a few Wall
Street workers who are reaping enormous profits.

the marketplace and as protecting large corporations from hostile raids. See Nathaniel C.
Nash, Federal Reserve's Curb on Bonds Is Assailed by the Administration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1985, at 1. Nonetheless, in a slightly modified and weakened form, the Federal Reserve
Board adopted its proposal on January 10, 1986: Purchase of Debt Securities to Finance
Corporate Takeovers, 12 C.F.R. § 207.112 (1987).
68. For a revealing description of the unique nature of this "junk bond" market, see
Allan Sloan & Howard Rudnitsky, Taking in Each Other's Laundry, FORBES, Nov. 19, 1984,
at 207.
69. By one estimate, a 1% increase in the national unemployment rate is associated with
37,000 deaths (20,000 of them heart attacks), 920 suicides, 650 homicides, 4,000 state mental
hospital admissions, and 3,300 state prison admissions. See RICHARD B. McKENZIE, FUrIIVE
INDUSTRY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 3 (1984).
70. Myron Magnet, Help! My Company Has Just Been Taken Over, FORTUNE, July 9,
1984, at 44-51.
71. David L. Schweiger & John M. Ivancevich, Human Resources: The Forgotten Factor
in Mergers and Acquisitions, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Nov. 1985, at 47-54, 58-61.
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COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR INJURIES ARISING

FROM CORPORATh TAKEOVERS
The legal protection of employees mirrors both ancient notions
about the protection of settled expectations and relations in civil society, and modem perceptions of the diminishing opportunities to
achieve security through wholly self-reliant means72 :
The observation is not new. We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and
most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages.
If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief
supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence
of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of
life is in another man's hands.73
Jobs are a good to be protected by law, but they are also a
bedrock of social life.74 The fact that they are being disrupted may
be evidence of some anti-social developments that need to be remedied.75
Common law remedies thus exist to protect workers, 76 and common law courts can be expected to fulfill their historic obligation to
apply old laws to new facts and developments in the marketplace.77

72. E.g., Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
20 (1965) (predicting "a growing demand that significant jobs be available for everyone");
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J 733 (1964) (referring to expanded notions
of property rights necessary to ensure employees' personal autonomy); Philip J. Levine, Comment, Towards a Property Rights in Employment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (1973) (noting that without restraint on power of dismissal, employers exercise dominion over
employees' fundamental liberties).
73. FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
74. E.g., Pugh v. See's Candy, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that employment contracts are terminable only for good cause whenever there is consideration for the contract or the parties agree to good cause termination).
75. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (forbidding an employer from terminating an employee at will where this termination is motivated by bad faith,
since such action affronts public policy).
76. E.g., Egerton v. Lord Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 437 (1853) (Truro L.) (indicating that "[p]ublic Policy . . . is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can
lawfully do that which has a tendency, to be injurious to the public or against the public
good ....
").
77. E.g., Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV.
463, 506-09 (1962).
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Specifically, the law protects contracts," and where no contract exists the law protects the expectancy of reasonable prospective economic advantage from interference.7 9 In the coming years, this simple principle of right will serve both to compensate victims of merger
mania, and to hold wrongdoers accountable for harms and "externalities" caused by their wrongful conduct."0
NOVELTY Is

No BAR

Although there is no case in which damages have been awarded
for unlawful interference with economic advantage resulting from junk
bond financed corporate takeover activity, the "novelty of a specific
occasion for application of a principle in this field is no reason for
according it a chilly reception.""' As Justice Brandeis and Samuel
Warren said:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found
necessary from time to time to define new the exact nature and
extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its
eternal youth grows to meet the demands of society.'

Thus, the nature of the tort of interference, consistent with generally
accepted common law methodology, lends itself to a case by case
78. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 493-97 (1956).
This is true in virtually every state. In 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228,
232-34 (La. 1989), the court overruled Kline v. Eubanks, 33 So. 211 (La. 1902), which previously had been considered as establishing the proposition that no action will lie in this
state for inducing breach of contract or interference with contractual relations by means which
are not otherwise unlawful. The Supreme Court said:
Moreover, a delictual rule such as Kline v. Eubanks that flatly and without good
reason deprives an innocent person of any remedy for damage to his contract right
caused intentionally and improperly by a corporate official is discordant with the
fundamental civil law principle that obliges a person to repair damage caused another by his fault. LA. CIV. CODE art. § 2315. In truth, the Kline v. Eubanks bar
is anachronisticallyunjust when compared with this court's application of the delictual principles to other issues and circumstances.
583 So.2d at 233-34. (Emphasis added.)
79. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (5th
ed. 1984).
80. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 385-88 (3rd ed. 1986).
81. Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
82. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890) (" . . . and the term "property" has grown to comprise every form of possession
- intangible as well as tangible.").
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analysis and renders a rule of thumb inapplicable.8 3
Other torts have already been supplied in the area of hostile
takeovers.' For example, workers have successfully sued under
fraudulent conveyance law to enjoin post-takeover corporate restructuring for wrongfully jeopardizing their rights. 5 The trend appears to
be that more aggrieved parties8 6 are seeking redress now that takeovers7 - especially those tainted by criminality - have lost their lus8
tre.
This solicitude for novelty is complemented by the law's aversion to early motions to dismiss. 8 As the New Jersey Supreme court

83. FoWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.12, at 515
(1956); Leslie Blau Co., 384 A.2d at 866.
84. See, e.g., Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buy-outs,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987) (arguing in favor of applying 16th Century fraudulent conveyance law to 1980-style leveraged buyouts).
85. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, et al. v. Safeway Stores Inc.,
F. Supp. _ (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Conti, J.).
86. Junk bond takeovers, including leveraged buy-outs, have also arguably trampled the
rights of non-workers. See, e.g., James A. White, 17T Sues RJR, Saying Buy-out Devalues
Bonds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1988, at C1 (noting that the value of old debt and bonds lose
value in the face "of the mountain of additional debt needed for buyouts."); Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUs. LAW. 413, 452-55 (1986);
Christopher Farrell, Takeover and Buyouts Clobber Blue Chip Bondholders, BUS. WK., Nov.
11, 1985, at 113. Creditors represent an intermediate class of participants in the corporation
who appear to have lost more than they have gained, although their long-term reaction may
not yet be fully visible. See also Steven E. Prokeseh, Merger Wave: How Stocks and Bonds
Fare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1986, at Al (citing recent examples and quoting securities industry
expert, Michael S. Hyland, stating that "[b]ondholders on both sides are often left holding the
bag."); Farrell, supra note 86, at 113 (viewing takeovers and buy-outs as wealth transfers
from bondholders to stockholders). Although traditional synergistic mergers typically increase
the firm's assets and hence the bondholders' security, the new generation of highly leveraged
takeovers has had the opposite effect. The recent series of credit downgradings by Moody's
and Standard & Poors, which have been the by-product of takeovers in a significant percentage of the cases, also provides evidence that creditors may have less ability to monitor risk
taking by management than neoclassical theory has assumed. L
Franchises may also have legitimate and actionable complaints when corporate mergers
damages their interests. See Claudia H. Deutsch, FranchiseesFight Back, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1988, § 3 (Business), at 1 (noting that franchisees are going to court in growing numbers).
87. This erosion of lustre is best illustrated by a comparison of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) and the more recent CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69 (1987). MITE seems to reflect the initial socio-economic glorification of the
hostile takeover as a model free market mechanism for efficiently reallocating economic resources. By the time CTS was decided, the Court gave expression to the developing political
skepticism about the virtues of the tender offer: "there is no reason to assume that the type
of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers will result in more
effective management or otherwise be beneficial to shareholders. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 92
n.13 (Powell, J.).
88. See, e.g., Printing Mart v. Sharp Elees., 563 A.2d 31, 48 (N.J. 1989).
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recently said in reinstating a tortious interference claim dismissed at
the pleading stage:
The importance of today's decision lies .. in its signal to trial
courts to approach with great caution applications for dismissal
under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure of a complaint to state a claim ...
[S]uch motions, almost always brought at the very earliest stage of
the litigation, should be granted in only the rarest of instances."s
THE NATURE OF A RAID
In the ordinary case of a hostile bid, a "Raider" will go after a
Target, which employs various workers."° The raid ordinarily comes
in the form of a bid to buy control of the targeted company.9 ' Instead of financing the bid with money, the Raider is backed by an
investment banker which issues a letter indicating that it is "highly
confident" that it can get financing for the bid at some rate of interest:
The typical opening maneuver in the new takeover wave - or, very
often, the event that starts a chain of events ending in a takeover is a cash tender offer to which the directors and managers of the
target company react with more or less hostility. The offer may be
improved upon, either by the original aggressor or by some other
company; meanwhile the target company, assisted by its investment
bankers, may solicit a bid from yet another company with which it
is more content to merge - a white knight. Eventually, either a
white knight or a hostile aggressor consummates the deal. Or the
takeover attempt may be defeated ... sometimes through the target

company's satisfying the aggressor by buying back his initial stake
in its stock at a premium over the market price - the almost universally-deplored practice known as greenmail.
The economic bases of the takeover wave are usually assumed to be
two: the undervaluation (or the perceived undervaluation) of the assets of asset-heavy companies by the stock market and the ready
availability of credit in gargantuan amounts from commercial banks
and other lenders - which are able to get premium interest rates

89. Id
90. See JOHN BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME (1988).
91. Id
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"'

In the ensuing titanic struggle following the putting of the Target
"in play," both companies incur substantial amounts of debt.9" The
loser of the struggle is often paid quite handsomely to go away:
94
Greenmail to the unsuccessful raider
, or golden parachutes for the
95
company.
the
lost
who
managers
In either event, the victor must then pay interest on the debt
incurred, or pay down the debt.96 Takeovers leave companies indebted. This indebtedness leaves the debtor too hard pressed to invest in
long-term growth and, thus, threatens the country's economic
strength.97 Limited cash flow goes to debt, not to investments in
equipment or to research and development. Busting up the company, 98 closing operations producing profits on capital less than the
interest on debt,' or recapitalizing are ways of dealing with the debt
that inevitably follows the takeover attempt. Again, the victor is not

92. Id. at 19.
93. A leveraged buy-out ("LBO") is a takeover in which the bidder expects ultimately to
pay the purchase price out of the cash flow generated by the target or by selling of the
target in toto, or more likely, piecemeal. Such a deal is generally financed through the sale
of junk bonds. E.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1986) (explaining leveraged buyout), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
94. BROOKS, supra note 90, at 20.
95. See supra note 39.
96. This is hardly a controversial allegation in the takeover game. Eg., In re Phillips
Petroleum Sec. Regulation, 738 F. Supp. 825, 833 (1990) (concluding that Pickens "from the
outset intended to put Unocal 'in play' and thereby either obtain control or 'greenmail' the
corporation in exchange for dropping its bid").
97. Accordingly, many state funds are foregoing the short term "takeover" profits for the
sake of the economy's long term strength. Anise C. Wallace, Ideas & Trends: Investing Pension Money; For State Funds, Buyouts Raise Skepticism and Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1988, § 4, at 32.
98. E.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Capitalism, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 n.40 (1987) (noting that in Pantry Pride's acquisition of Revlon, the
purchase price of $1.7 billion, fimanced in part by $725 million in junk bonds, was partially
recovered by the sale of Revlon's prescription pharmaceutical business for $690 million, its
Noreliff Thayer, Rehis, and Beecham subsidiaries for $395 million, and its Technicon subsidiary for $300 million).
99. See e.g., Carlo M. Sardella, A Town Is Losing Biggest Employer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1986 at 8. According to the article:
The biggest employer in Camden County Borough, the building Material Customer
Service Center of Owens-Coming Fibreglass Corporation, has begun a shutdown
process that will terminate all but a handful of its 800 workers.
Some 100 were laid off last Monday, and 500 will follow tomorrow because of a
'restructuring" brought on by the company's successful but costly defeat last August of a hostile takeover attempt.
Id [Emphasis added].
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necessarily closing "unprofitable" businesses, but is instead seeking a
more profitable mix of business usually in the short term."° Generally, the target of a tender offer loses its independence.1"'
However, all of these ways of dealing with the debt that inevitably follows the takeover attempt foreseeably involve the loss of
jobs. 1°2 Congressman Lantos summed it up best, perhaps, when he
reported on hostile takeovers:
However, all too many of the recent wave of takeover attempts
involve a profitable, healthy company which is targeted by a corporate raider or by another company seeking to gobble it up for a
quick profit. The money-hungry raider or the aggressor company
purchases enough stock to put the target company "into play."
Whether the bidder is successful in the takeover attempt or whether
the target company fends off the attack by restructuring, it spells
bad news for the workers. When the takeover is successful, it is
frequently highly leveraged and financed by the use of high-yield,
high risk or so-called "junk bonds." In order to pay back this bor-

100. Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors And The "Social Costs" of Takeovers - Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TuL. L. REV. 3, 7 n.6 (1989).
101. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1149 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating Market Control] (indicating that only 20-25% of
target companies remain independent following an initial tender offer); David W. Leebron,
Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 195 n.144
(1986) (reviewing empirical evidence on the results of tender offers).
102. E.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985) (referring to
Household's attorneys explanation that "the possible adverse effect this type of activity could
have on employees") (emphasis added); Thomas J. Murray, Here Comes the 'Tin' Parachute,
DUNN'S BUS. MONTH, Jan. 1987, at 63 (stating that when a takeover bid is made, "[mI]any
key employees - well aware of acquisitors' penchant these days for wholesale layoffs and
salary and benefit cuts - quit rather than wait out an uncertain future, or are so distracted
from their work that the company suffers") (emphasis added).
In the wake of the Chevron-Gulf acquisition in 1984, the combined entity laid off
10,000 employees (or 12% of its work force), and it has further reduced its work force by
2000 more in 1985. Following Texaco's acquisition of Getty Oil, Texaco announced a 26%
reduction in its work force. See Richard B. Schmitt, Depleted Field. Despite Raiders' Lust,
Oil Industry Is Facing Retrenchment Period, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1985, at 1, 9. Nor is this
pattern unique to the oil industry. Following Baxter Travenol Laboratories acquisition of
American Hospital Supply Corporation, plans were announced to lay off 10% of the combined work force, or 6000 workers. See Baxter Plans Layoffs; Merger Is Completed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1985, at D-4.
Even when the bidder is defeated, the target may be compelled to trim its work force
substantially as the result of the added leveraged it took on in conneetion with its defense.
For descriptions of layoffs at CBS, Martin Marietta and Phillips Petroleum following "successful" takeover defenses, see John Nielsen, Management Layoffs Won't Quit, FoRTUNE, Oct.
28, 1985, at 46.
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rowed money, the purchaser breaks up parts of the company for
resale, costs are cut, and workers are let go.
Similarly, even when the target company is successful in fighting
off a takeover attempt, it does so at a tremendous cost, saddling
itself with a huge debt in the process. To deal with this new debt,
productive assets are sold, plants are closed, research and development spending is cut back, all of which have negative consequences

for workers.

3

Therein lies the essence of the tort of interference." °4
The inevitable adverse impact on workers and the unions is a
function of two things. First, debt incurred in legitimately defending
the unlawful assault, or in financing the successful takeover. A high
yield corporate bond ("junk bond") financed takeover is unique."0 5
Junk bonds simply are bonds of less than investment grade." 6 Junk
bonds financing of tender offers involves the use of a highly leveraged shell company that the bidder funds with a minimal amount of
cash. The bulk of the shell's capital derives from a combination of
privately placed, high coupon debt instruments,0 7 and bank fmanc-

103. Impacts on Workers of Takeovers, Leveraged Buyouts, Corporate Restructuring, and
Greenmai4 Before Employment and Housing Subcommittee of Government Operations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Opening Statement of Chairman Tom Lantos). The problem extends
to managers also. See also V.R. Buzzota, A Quiet Crisis in the Work Place, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1985, at A-27; Middle Managers Are Still Sitting Ducks, Bus. WK., Sept. 16, 1985,
at 34; Steven E. Prokesch, "People Trauma" in Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1985, at
D-1; John Nielsen, Management Layoffs Won't Quit, FORTUNE, Oct. 28, 1985, at 46. For
companies, such as CBS, which laid off 2000 workers one month after leveraging up its
financial structure to defeat Ted Turner's hostile bid, or Phillips Petroleum, which fought off
Boone Pickens, the takeover phenomenon appears to be the principal explanation. See Salley
B. Smith, Sweeping Staff Cuts at CBS News, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1985, at C30; The
Shrinkage at Phillip Pete, Bus. WK., May 27, 1985, at 46 (noting a 10% work force cut).
104. In addition to corporate raiders, their helpers may be liable as aiders and abettors, if
they have given "substantial assistance and encouragement" to one whose conduct "constitute[d] a breach of duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973).
105. Junk bond financing is a particularly attractive means of acquiring a company whose
stock is considered to be undervalued. In some cases companies with large investments in
research and development are "undervalued."
106. Junk bonds usually have a rate of return that is three to four percentage points higher than is the typical rate of return on corporate bonds of investment grade. However, junk
bonds also have a default rate that is 20 times higher than that on all corporate bonds. The
real rate of loss, however, is closer to one percent, because issuers of junk bonds often pay
back some of the principal and interest See, Edward 1. Altman & Scott A. Nammacher, The
Default Rate Experience in High Yield Corporate Debt, Mar. 1985 (coming from a study
conducted for Morgan Stanley & Co.).
107. The financing of Junk bond takeovers frequently occurs through private placements
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big that is sometimes coupled with preferred stock."' 8
After completing the acquisition, the bidder often either (1) sells
the assets of the target (a "bust-up" takeover) and retires the debt
instruments with the proceeds, or (2) restructures the company to
meet its increased debt burden."° If the acquisition is successfully
defended, the target has the same two limited options. Both options
mean that workers lose jobs. 10 A junk bond takeover or defense
The result of each
leads to either a "bust-up," or recapitalization."'
12
of these alternatives is, again, a loss of jobs.

although bidders have also sold junk bonds to the public. Public offerings may raise the
issue whether the bidder has adequately disclosed all material information concerning its acquisition intentions. In particular, information as to whether there has been adequate disclosure
of the intended use of proceeds, whether the prospectus speaks generally of possible acquisition, and whether soon after the public offering the bidder intends to start a tender offer for
a particular target. Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction).
108. IL
109. See Lawrence Lederman & Michael Goroff, Recapitalization Transactions, 19 REv.
SEC. & COMMODmEs REG. 241, 243 (1986).
110. Some commentators, including Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan,
criticized the craze for junk bonds because such financing results in significantly higher leveraging of companies acquired in hostile tender offers, or companies that have successfully
defended hostile tender offers. Although bidders assert that companies generally do not make
sufficient use of the debt market, their critics equate the increase in leveraging with the market trends that occurred before the stock market crash of 1929. They argue that increased
debt may result in more bankruptcies in the future. E.g., Randall Smith & Kevin G. Salwen,
Takeover Stocks Hurt On Concern Over Bids, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1988, at C1.
111. In a recapitalization, borrowed funds are used to finance an exchange by which
public shareholders trade their common stock for a substantial amount of cash plus shares of
a new class of common stock in the now heavily leveraged company. Management however,
elects to forego any cash payment for their stock (or options), instead receiving increased
amounts of new common stock. The result of a recapitalization, like that of a Leveraged
Buyout (LBO), is a highly leveraged company. In a recapitalization, unlike an LBO, the
public shareholders retain an equity position in the company. Lawrence Lederman & Michael
Goroff, Recapitalization Transactions, 19 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 241, 241-42
(1986).
112. Workers lose even when jobs are saved. Between 1980 and 1985 employers have
terminated over 700 pension plans and collected $6.7 billion in "surplus" assets. Nearly $3
billion was recaptured in 1984 alone. This figure equals the total of the previous three years
combined, thus illustrating a rising tide. Probably the largest and best-known recent case involved United Airlines, which announced in 1985 that it intended to recapture over $1 billion
for general corporate purposes. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Washington Watch: Pension Plans'
Surplus Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1985, at D2. As of August 28, 1985, $3.1 billion had
been recaptured during 1985, thus exceeding 1984's level.
In United's case, the recapture was announced as a defensive move designed to thwart
any raiders. The surplus assets were placed in a trust that could only be used to finance
corporate expansion. See Harlan S. Byrne, UAL Will Use Some of Unit's Pension Funds,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 1985, at A2. In other cases as well, the raiding of the pension fund's
assets appears to have been designed to help finance future acquisitions. See Pension Fund
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THE

PROBLEM OF SECRET

Current securities and antitrust regulations permit a raider to
acquire significant share positions before making any public disclosure
concerning its purchases and its intentions with respect to the target."' As such, a raider can reap a tremendous profit simply by acquiring a large stake and then putting the target "into play.' 4 The
"play" means that stock prices will rise on the initial purchase. Moreover, once a substantial stock position is obtained, the raider is in a
position to attempt a tender offer for the target company or to force a
significant corporate restructuring of the company through a proxy
contest.
SECTION 13(D)

Through the Williams Act, enacted in 1968, Congress provided
for an "early warning" mechanism in corporate acquisitions. 15 Under Exchange Act Section 13(d), persons acquiring more than five
percent of a public company's stock must disclose their ownership
and investment intentions,1
This provision alerts a target
company's management to possible "creeping acquisitions" of the
company by outsiders. In 1972, Congress supplemented the Williams
Act with Section 13(g), which essentially requires all five percent
beneficial owners to disclose their holdings, regardless of when they
were acquired." 7 The net effect of Sections 13(d) and 13(g) is that
a target company is alerted to the identity of its major shareholders."' Exchange Act Regulation 13D-G delineates the disclosure

Shift Is Planned by FMC, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1985, at D-4.
113. See Revlon. Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 808-09. Although some state takeover statutes
(such as Delaware's business combination statute), and flip-in provisions of shareholder rights
plans, limit the number of shares which may be purchased by a raider or other investor
without potentially serious consequences, these limits are really just ceilings which still allow
substantial stock accumulation.
114. See id
115. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (1988).
118. See Securities Exchange of 1934 §§ 13(d), 13(g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(g)
(1988).
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duties of persons falling under these sections." 9
Exchange Act Section 13(d) and its regulations provide that any
party falling under this rule must file a Schedule 13D form disclosing
the interest. 120 Stock traded on a national securities exchange must
be registered under Section 12(b)", and its ownership would necessarily be subject to Section 13(d)."
Schedule 13D requires the identification of the filing person or
group acquiring the securities, and their relation to the target company." Importantly, the document must disclose the purpose of the
securities acquisition. 24 The reporting persons specifically must describe any plans to acquire additional securities, to take over the company, or to materially affect the issuer's business." As a practical
matter, securities lawyers generally couch these sections in language
that is broad enough to enable the filers to pursue a wide range of
options for future acquisitions or control of the issuer's stock.
A raider can quietly and legally purchase a target company's
stock up to a level just short of 5% of the outstanding shares, the
point at which the SEC requires public disclosure. 26 The actual
purchases are typically made through obscure corporations and partnerships in order to keep secret the identity of the raider. Before
crossing the 5% level, at which point the raider has 10 days to make
a public disclosure of its target company holdings, the raider firms up
its group and obtains the financing required for its planned stock
purchases. Once set, it crosses the 5% threshold, commencing a vigorous open market purchase program. Often an acquirer will be able
to accumulate up to 10% or 20% of the target's
share before disclos127
ing such purchases in a Schedule 13D filing.
A Schedule 13D must be submitted within ten days of the securities acquisition (although in 1985-1986, there was considerable sup-

119. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 - 240.13d-7 (1992).
120. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
121. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988).
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
123. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-101 (1992).
124. See id
125. Id
126. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
127. A number of legislative proposals have been put forward which would close the
10-day window period under § 13(d) of the Exchange Act, some of which would also reduce
the 5% threshold. However, these proposals have been lost in the broader debate over takeover reform legislation.
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port in Congress and the SEC for "closing the 10-day window"). In
addition to filing the Schedule 13D with the SEC and the target, each
exchange trading the security must receive a Schedule.'2 8 If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in Schedule 13D, the filing
person must promptly amend the Schedule and send it to the SEC,
the issuer, and the exchanges." 9
SECTION 14(D)
Section 14(d) 30 , which was enacted as part of the Williams
Act, essentially -makes it unlawful to initiate a tender offer unless a
statement is filed with the SEC.13 ' Any party that makes a tender
offer for a Section 12 equity security must file a Tender Offer Statement through a Schedule 14D-1 if such party will own more than 5
percent of a class of the security.'32 The 14-D form requires the reporting party to identify itself, and to disclose its sources of funds
and the number of shares subject to the offer. 133 Other important
disclosures include the bidder's purpose for the offer, business plans
for the target, and present or future relationships between the bidder
and the target or its executives."' As with the Schedule 13D language, Schedule 14D filings usually are drafted in such a fashion as
to keep the bidder's option open, pending completion of the tender
offer.
Under Rule 14d-3, the Schedule must be filed "as soon as prac-

128. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988).
129. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1988). Similar
provisions apply to persons subject to Section 13(g). Certain beneficial owners, usually institutions such as registered investment companies or employee benefit plans, may use the "short
form" provided by Schedule 13G. Additionally, the institution must have acquired its holdings
in the ordinary course of its business and not with the purpose of affecting control of the
issuer. Such "persons," in lieu of filing a Schedule 13D, may file a Schedule 13G within 45
days of the end of the calendar year in which they obtained their five percent holding. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1992).
The 13G document must be sent to the SEC, the target company, and the principal exchange where the security is traded. Additionally, persons acquiring more than ten percent of
an equity security must file a Schedule 13G within ten days of the end of the irst month
after the transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(2) (1992). As with the Schedule 13D, any
material changes must be reported on a new Schedule 13G, and filed with the SEC, the
target, and the exchange.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
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ticable on the date of the commencement of the tender offer." The
schedule must be filed with the SEC, and hand delivered to the target
and the competitive bidders.135 Additionally, the bidder must give
telephonic notice to the exchanges where the target's securities are
traded, followed by a mailing of the Schedule.' 36 The telephonic notice preferably should be given before the opening of the exchanges.
For NASDAQ-listed stocks, similar notification must be given to the
NASD. If any material change occurs in the information disclosed in
the Schedule 14D-1, the reporting person promptly must amend the
Schedule 3 7and file it with the SEC, the target company, and the ex1
changes.
HART-SCOTr-RODINO ACr
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197638
(the "HRS Act") generally requires an acquirer to notify the Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice (and the target) and wait 30 days (unless there is 1early
ter39
stock.
target's
the
of
million
$15
acquiring
before
mination)
The formal process of obtaining government clearance for a
merger begins with the filing of pre-merger notification report forms,
when required, with the F1C and the Justice Department in compliance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976."4 The two agencies
then decide which will review the proposed merger, based on their
relative workloads and their expertise in a specific industry. The
Justice Department tends to review mergers in steel, brewing, telecommunications, and financial services whereas the FTC usually handles the cement, food distribution, professional services, and chemicals
industries. When both agencies are in conflict over a high-profile
transaction raising serious antitrust question, the one that gets the case
usually is decided through bargaining.
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the transaction may not go
forward for 30 calendar days (15 in the case of a cash tender offer)
from the filing of pre-merger notification.' 4' If a merger presents no

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(b) (1988).

140.
141.

15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(a) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1)(b) (1988).
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antitrust question, the parties may seek early termination of the waiting period. 42 Otherwise, the reviewing agency will use the waiting
period to conduct a preliminary investigation. If the agency concludes
that the transaction is lawful, it will let the waiting period expire. But
if the preliminary investigation has not satisfied the reviewing agency,
it will ask for more information, a step that automatically extends the
waiting period until 20 calendar days (10 days in the case of a cash
tender 43offer) after the parties have substantially complied with the request

1

The HRS Act, however, is not primarily concerned with the full
and fair disclosure of an acquirer's accumulation of the target's
shares, and thus provides incomplete protection against secret share
accumulations. First, an acquirer can accumulate in excess of $15
million of a target's shares up to a 10% stake if it can establish that
the acquisition "is solely for the purpose of investment. " '44 Then,
subject to FTC scrutiny (and possible sanctions) if the change occurs
too quickly, the acquiror can change its subjective intent and file for
HSR clearance at a higher threshold level. Moreover, a loophole in
the HSR filing requirements has permitted raiders to avoid the filing
requirements by forming partnerships to accumulate target shares.
Effective July 3, 1987, the FTC promulgated a new rule that
partially closed the "partnership loophole." 14 The new rule requires
HSR Act filings in connection with acquisitions by newly-formed
partnerships where one of the partners has the right to 50 percent or
more of (i) the profits of the entity or (ii) the assets of the entity
upon its dissolution."4 While the new rule does not apply to partnerships in which no partner satisfies the 50 percent standard, the
FTC takes the position that a partnership that is formed for the purcomply with the HSR Act filing
pose of avoiding the obligation 1to
47
disregarded.
be
will
requirements
In September 1988, the FTC issued a notice of proposed rule-

142. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1988).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2) (1988).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(11) (1988).
145. 52 Fed. Reg. 20,063 (1987) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 801).
146. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b)(1) (1992).
147. IL In an early application of the new rule, the FTC reportedly launched an investigation of T. Boone Pickens' role in the purchases by Ivanhoe Partners of Newmont Mining
shares; no action has been taken to date. The FTC also reportedly deadlocked (by a 2-2
vote) on bringing a preliminary injunction action against the Rales brothers' acquisition of
shares in Interco for violations of the HSR Act's requirements; the prospect of a civil penalty
case is reportedly still under consideration.
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making in which it proposed three alternative rule amendments which
would raise the initial reporting threshold under the HSR Act to
10%.148 According to the FTC, the principal motivations behind the
proposed rule change are to (i) reduce the non-antitrust-related incentive to avoid HSR filing obligations; (ii) eliminate any unnecessary
burden on the parties; and (iii) avoid unnecessary interference with
the securities149laws' disclosure requirements and the market for corporate control.
THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS
"The right of a person to pursue a lawful business and enjoy the
fruits and advantages of one's industries or efforts are rights which
the law protects." 5 ' Workers have a fundamental property right to
expect that third parties will not improperly interfere with their expectancy in continued employment.15' Acquired capital, as much as the
labor to create it, enjoys this basic legal protection:
As a part of the right of acquiring property there resides in every
man the right of making contracts for the purchase and sale of property, and contracts for personal services which amount to the purchase and sale of labor. It makes little difference whether the right
that underlies contracts of the latter sort is called a personal right or
a property right. It seems to us impossible to draw a distinction
between a right of property and a right of acquiring property that
will make a disturbance of the latter right any less actionable than a
disturbance of the former. In a civilized community which recognizes the right of private property among its institutions, the notion is
intolerable that a man should be protected by the law in the enjoybut left unprotected by the law
ment of property once it is 5acquired,
2
in his efforts to acquire it.1
The breath of this principle is limited only by the boundaries of
industry and imagination. Since a large part of what is most valuable
in modern life depends upon "probable expectancies," as social and
industrial life becomes more complex the courts must define and pro-

148. 53 Fed. Reg. 36,831-03 (1988).
149. Id
150. See, e.g., MODEL JURY CHARGES, NEW JERsEY - CIVIL, 73, No. 3.18(A); see also
supra notes 6-7, 54-55, 71.
151. Sustick v. Slatina, 137 A.2d 54, 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
152. Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am., 65 A. 165, 170-71 (N.J. 1906).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

27

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

198

[Vol. 10:I

53
tect these interests from undue interference.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF RULE

In the early history of the common law, damages were recoverable for the seduction, beating or enticing for misemployment of a
servant. That is, an interference with contract by unlawful or improper means were actionable. In Lumley v. Gye,' 4 however, the principle was applied to interference with any kind of personal service
employment or contractual relation, regardless of the propriety vel non
of the means used to entice the breach.1 55 In that case, the defendant, with the knowledge that a famous opera singer had contracted
with the plaintiff to appear exclusively at his theater, persuaded her to
refuse to perform. 6 In so doing, the defendant did not use force,
duress, fraud, defamatory statements, or other unlawful means. 7
The English Court held that the defendant was nevertheless liable for
58
damages.1

In 1881 in Bowen v. Hall,1 9 the English Court solidified the
nature of the tort, stating that, if either the ends sought or means
applied were improper, an actionable wrong had occurred:
Wherever a man does an act which in law and in fact is a wrongful
act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence
of it, produce injury to another, and which in the particular case
does produce such an injury, an action on the case will lie ....
Merely to persuade a person to break his contract, may not be
wrongful in law or fact... But if the persuasion be used for the

indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act ....

and

153. See Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 53 A. 230 (N.J. Ch. 1902).
154. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
155. Id
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id The tort of intentional interference was always a form of law enforcement. The
enticement-of-servant action, which in Lumley became the tortious interference action, originated not as a recognition of property rights, but as a private remedy to correct a social problem.
The enticement-of-servant action was, in essence, an implied private right of action
relative to the goals of the Statute of Laborers, 23 E & W 3 (1349), and was intended to
maintain social order by minimizing the movement of menial laborers.
159. 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881).
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therefore an actionable act if injury ensues from it."

The principle of Lumley v. Gye"61, and Bowen v. Hall 62, has
been generally accepted in the United States and New Jersey, and has
been applied to interference with any contractual relation, whether
employment or non-employment in nature. 63 Such interference with
employment, whether by improper means or for a wrongful end is
clearly actionable. 1"
THE RESTATEMENT

Although the tort of interference may differ among the states, the
RESTATEMENT appears to reflect a near consensus in its articulation:

§ 766.

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PERFORMANCE OF
CONTRACT BY THIRD PERSON.

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another
and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person

not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third
person to perform the contract.

§ 766A.

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ANOTHER'S
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OWN CONTRACT.

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another
and a third person, by preventing the other from performing the
contract or causing his performance to be more expensive or bur-

densome, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss
resulting to him.

160. Id at 337-38.
161. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
162. 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881).
163. See Levin v. Kuhn Loeb & Co., 417 A.2d 79 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1980); Louis
Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 175 A. 62 (NJ. 1934); Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am., Local
No. 17, 65 A. 165 (N.J. 1906); Toler v. State, 96 S.E.2d. 593 (Ga. 1957).
164. Avtec Industries, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 500 A.2d 712, 715 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1985) (noting that the persuasion of an employee to change jobs, if done to injure the
employer or by unlawful means is wrongful); Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. v. Towne Craft,
Etc., Inc., 182 A.2d 387 (NJ Super. Ch. Div. 1962).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

§ 766B.

[Vol. 10:1

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
CONTRACTUAL RELATION.

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relations, whether the interference consists
of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to
enter into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation. 65

These sections of the RESTATEMENT clearly provide for the recovery of economic losses where the defendant interferes intentionally. The unanswered question is when is interference improper and
who decides what is improper.
ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

The best way to answer these queries is to break down the tort
into its constitutive elements for separate analysis. Such a general
statement of the cause of action for unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage is as follows: 1
1.

2.
3.

The existence of a contract, or a reasonable expectancy of
prospective economic relations, or a legally protected
interest between the plaintiff and a third party;
The defendant's knowledge of the contract, expectancy or
interest;
The defendant wrongfully and without justification167 in-

165. RESTATEAENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 766-766B (1979).
166. The following five elements reflect a general consensus nationally. E.g., Beane v.
McMullen, 291 A.2d 37, 46-47 (Md. 1972); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975);
Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Coolde Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Own v.
Williams, 77 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 1948).

Alternatively, a cause of action for a tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage can be articulated as requiring three showings: (1) a third party intentionally and
wrongfully interferes (2) with a present or prospective relationship between two other parties
(3) from which relationship the complaining party reasonably expected to receive economic
benefit or advantage. Borbely v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959, 976 (D.N.J.
1981).

167. This is not true in all states. However, many courts demand as an additional element
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4.

5.

terfered with plaintiffs expectancy of economic advantage
or benefit, or otherwise rendered impossible the performance of the contract;
It is reasonably probable that plaintiff would have realized his economic advantage or benefit absent the wrongful act of the defendant;
Damages to the plaintiff resulting from the foregoing.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
To further focus the discussion, a set of Model Instructions on

interference and wrongfulness is set forth. Although these may not be
appropriate in every case, and sometimes differ from the Restatement,
their heuristic value here will appear in the course of the discussion.

3.18(a)

UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

The right of a person to pursue a lawful business and to enjoy
the fruits and advantages of one's industry or efforts are rights
which the law protects against unjustified and wrongful interference
by another person.
Thus, the law protects a person's interest in reasonable expectations of economic advantage.
In order that the plaintiff may recover damages for a wrongful
act, such wrongful act must be found to have interfered with a reasonable expectancy of economic advantage or benefit on the part of
the plaintiff.

the allegation that the means or ends were improper.
If the act complained of does not rest upon some legitimate interest [i.e., a proper
end], or if there is sharp dealing or over-reaching, or other conduct below the
behavior of fair men similarly situated [i.e., an improper means] the ensuing loss
to the plaintiff should be redressed.
£-g., MODEL JURY CHARGES, NEW JERSEY

CIVIL, No. 3.18(C). Since many "raiders," and
other "players" engage in such objectionable conduct, this added requirement seems not too
onerous. See, e.g., Steve Schwartz, Nine Transactions in the Boesky Investigation, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 23.
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Thus, plaintiff must provide the following elements:
1.

The existence of a reasonable expectation of economic
advantage or benefit belonging or accruing to the

plaintiff;
2.

That the defendant had knowledge or such expectancy
of economic advantage;

3.

That the defendant wrongfully and without justification
interfered with plaintiff's expectancy of economic advantage or benefits;

4.

That in the absence of the wrongful act of the defendant it is reasonably probable that the plaintiff would
have realized his economic advantage or benefit (i.e.,
effected the sale of the property and received a commission); and

5.

That the plaintiff sustained damages as a result thereof.

It is for you to determine, therefore, whether the plaintiff has
established by a preponderance of the evidence all of the elements
outlined above. If you so find, then you should return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. Otherwise, you should find for the defendant.16

3.18(c)

UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS, etc. WRONGFUL ACT - DEFINITION

In determining whether the defendant committed a wrongful
act, the ultimate inquiry is whether defendant unjustifiably interfered
with plaintiff's fair opportunity to conduct his legitimate business
affairs.

168. The pattern New Jersey instructions from which the foregoing is drawn identify the
following related cases: Harris v. Per, 197 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1964); Middlesex Concrete Corp.
v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 181 A.2d 774 (NJ. 1962); Raymond v. Cregar, 185 A.2d 856 (N.J.
1962); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Val. Farms, 117 A.2d 859 (N.J. 1955); Myers v. Arcadio,
Inc. 180 A.2d 329 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1962); Independent Dairy Workers Union of
Highstown v. Milk Drivers, Local No. 680, 30 N.J. 173 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §
766 (1979).
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Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his
own enterprise, industry and skill, free from unjustified and wrong-

ful interference. (He has no right to be protected against fair and
legitimate competition).
Thus, the law protects a person in the pursuit of his livelihood.

(True, he cannot complain of every disappointment; others too, may
further their equal interests, if the means are fair).
If the act complained of does not rest upon some legitimate
interest, or if there is sharp dealing or overreaching, or other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly situated, the ensuing
loss to the plaintiff should be redressed.
Hence one who unjustifiably interferes with the contract (or
reasonably expectation of economic advantage) of another has committed a wrongful act."6
EACH CASE

Is FACr SPECIFIC

The foregoing elements are matters of fact, and do not lend
themselves to pre-trial dismissal.17 These questions of expectancy,
causation, and damage invariably must be tried to the finder of
fact.17 This means that motions for summary judgment will rarely
be granted.
THE CONTRACT, EXPECTANCY OR INTEREST

Either a contract,"7 a legally protected interest, 73 or even a

169. The Pattern Instructions identify the following supporting cases: Harris, 197 A.2d
359; Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 72 A.2d 197, 203 (NJ. 1950) ("[A] wrongful act is any
act which in the ordinary course will infringe upon the rights of another to his damage,
except it be done in the exercise of an equal or superior right."); Raymond, 185 A.2d 856
("Malicious interference is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or
excuse."); Sokolay v. Edline, 167 A.2d 211, 220 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1961) (noting
that to sustain the allegations that defendant maliciously interfered with plaintiff's employment
there must be proof of (1) actual interference by defendant, and (2) the malicious nature of
such interference).
170. See, MODEL JURY CHARGES, NEW JERSEY - CIIL, No. 3.18(A).
171. E.g., Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859 (N.J. 1978); Avtec Indus., Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 500 A.2d 712, 715 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985).
172. "The ... contract of employment may be written or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a
shovel and providing a workplace." Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984).
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mere expectancy, 74 will satisfy this first element. If the contract is
void, as opposed to merely voidable, 75 an action may be
barred. 76
It is well established that interference with a prospective
advantage 177 - absent a written contract - may result in tort liability. 178 As noted by the Court in Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex179 :
"mhe cause of action... does not depend upon the existence of a
legally enforceable relationship. 'The mere fact that a contract is
unenforceable between the parties affords no justification for the act
of a third person, who, for his own purposes, takes steps which
prevent its performance by one of the parties to it, who, although
not bound to execute it, is willing and anxious to do so.' "'
This is an expansive concept. "An injury to a person's business by

See also Advanced Indus. Sec., Inc. v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 377
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1967). Such a contract might even be a labor contract. However, since
§ 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (the "NLRA") (requiring unions
and employers to "meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment") does not apply to a company's decision to relocate or terminate a portion of its operations, how can a claim for termination due
to jobs terminated as a result of third party interference be preempted as against a third party
tortfeasor? First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
More important, "[Tortious interference against nonsignatories is not a federal claim
authorized by Section 301, nor is recognition of such a claim by the courts defensible as an
exercise of federal common law powers." Elizabeth Z. Ysrael, Note, Federal Common Law of
Labor Contracts: Recognizing A Federal Claim of Tortious Interference, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1051, 1066 (1986).
173. !Fg., Leslie Blan Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1978).
174. E.g., Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985); M.C. Dransfield,
Annotation, Liability of One Who Induces or Causes Third Person Not to Enter Into or
Continue a Business Relation with Another, 9 A.L.R. 2D 228, 228-271 (1950); Joel E. Smith,
Annotation, Liability of Third Party for Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationship
Between Two Other Parties, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 195, 195-211 (1981); James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Liability for Interference with At Will Business Relationship, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 9, 9-117
(1981).
175. A contract may be void for illegality. E/g., Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes,
Inc., 207 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1965) (addressing illegal restraint of trade).
176. A contract that is merely voidable will not bar a suit. E.g., Mina L. Smith, Inc. v.
Cyprus Indus. Minerals Co., 427 A.2d 1114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Daugherty v.
Kessler, 286 A.2d 95 (Md. 1972); Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 44 A. 715 (N.J. 1929).
177. This concept of advantage is broadly construed. See Longo v. Reilly, 114 A.2d 302
(N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1955) (indicating that fraudulent conduct resulted in the plaintiff's
defeat in an election to an office). This was treated as wrongful interference with a business
or property right
178. Harris, 197 A.2d at 363.
179. 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985).
180. Il at 1407.
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procuring others not to deal with him... is an actionable
wrong.""' The cause of action may be predicated upon the reasonable expectation that a contract would have been entered into but for
the interference." s
In a hostile takeover case, the workers' expectancy will be easy
to show. The target-employer's track record, its potential, its cash
flow and market conditions may be especially probative. Ironically,
this is the very evidence that likely motivated the raid in the first
instance.
DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF CONTRACr,
EXPECTANCY OR INTEREST

The worker must show some knowledge of the contract or relaThis question of fact is ordinarily quite
tion by the raider.'
straightforward. Most hostile bidders admit to having done some
analysis of the target company in public Security and Exchange Commission filings and their public sources.'
The worker need only show that the Raider had knowledge of
the existence of a contract generally; there is no requirement that the
worker prove knowledge of its specific terms.'
Indeed, a mistaken
86
irrelevant.
is
void
is
contract
the
that
belief
The raider's knowledge of this expectancy is usually admitted in
press releases or the raider's public disclosures. In any event, this
expectancy by workers is disclosed in the target's public filings which
the raider relies upon.

181.
182.

Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 66 (NJ. 1934).
Id. at 68.

183.

Id.; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766, cmt. i (1979).

184.

THE ACQUISITIONS MANUAL, A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING AND EVALUATING BUSINESs

ACQUISITIONS 67 (Sumner N. Levine, ed. 1989):
To obtain information on a Target's labor contract, contact the public affairs or research department of the relevant labor union and request a copy of the contract.
Labor union addresses are listed in the Encyclopedia of Associations (Gale Research Co., Detroit, Ml) and the Directory of U.S. Labor Organizations (Bureau of
National Affairs, Washington, DC). The Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington
provides data on employment and wages in the nonagricultural industries.
Id In other words, it is common practice to do research on the Target's labor situation.
185. E/g., Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Co-op Creamery, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d
179 (3d Dept. 1960).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766, cmt. i (1979).
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DEFENDANT'S INTENT To INTERFERE
A claim for tortious interference with contract requires proof that
a third party intentionally interfered with a present or prospective
relationship between two other parties, from which relationship the
complaining party reasonably expected to receive economic benefit or
advantage. 87 Intent is defined by the law as that purpose or aim or
state of mind with which a person acts or fails to act. Ordinarily, it is
reasonable to infer that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of his act."'8 An intentional tort is an act committed
with the intent to cause harm to another, or committed with the belief
that such injury is substantially certain to occur.8 9
Prosser tells us that the legal concept of intent is much broader
than the mere having of a purpose to bring about a specific resuit." ° Consequences desired and those substantially certain to follow are both within the concept of intent. Thus a specific intent to
cause a result is not an essential element of an intentional tort where
the action proceeds despite a perceived threat of harm to others which
is substantially certain, not merely likely, to occur.1 9' The existence
of this knowledge or intent on the part of the actor may be inferred
from his conduct or surrounding circumstances." 9
Intent may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence.
Indeed, it can rarely be established by any other means. While witnesses may see and hear, and may be able to give direct evidence of
what a person does or fails to do, they do not likewise see and hear

187. See, e.g., Harris v. Pen, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (1964); Lewis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice,
72 A.2d 197, 202-03 (N.J. 1950). it is illegal to commit "an act with the malicious intent of
inflicting injury upon [a] rival's business. .. ." Van Horn v. Van Horn, 28 A. 669, 670
(NJ. 1894); see Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 117 A.2d 889, 895 (N.J. 1955);
Harris, 197 A.2d 359.
188. This is the established definition of intent. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 310
F.2d 924, 930 n.9 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963) (referring to a criminal
case); Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. H. W. Ivey Constr. Co., 137 S.E.2d 528, 531 (Ga. Ct.

App. 1964).
189. E.g., McGroarty v. Great American Ins. Co., 329 N.E.2d 172, 175 (N.Y. 1975)
("Certainly one may intend to run a red light but not intend that the catastrophic result of
collision with another car occur. Calculated risks can result in accidents.").
190.

W. PAGE KEETON & ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

6,

at 30 (5th ed. 1984).

191.

See id, § 7, at 34.

192. See, McGroarty, 329 N.E. at 175 (quoting Messersmith v. American Fid. Co., 133
N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917), revdd, 175 N.Y.S. 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919)).
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what a person intends to do or to refrain from doing." In determining whether the defendant intentionally interfered look at the
defendant's conduct and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the jury may draw an inference concerning the defendant's intent.
That inference is that the defendant intended by his conduct, or
lack of conduct, those natural and probable consequences that one
standing in like circumstances, and possessing like knowledge, should
reasonably have expected to result from the same act knowingly done,
or knowingly omitted, by him. If the defendant's conduct was in
willful violation of a known right of the plaintiff, then the requisite
intent was present.
"[I]f there is no desire at all to accomplish the interference and
it is brought about only as a necessary consequence of the conduct of
the actor engaged in for an entirely different purpose, his knowledge
of this makes the interference intentional, but the factor of motive
carries little weight toward producing a determination that the interference was improper."" 9
If the defendant's conduct in interfering with the plaintiff's relaunlawful, the necessary intent is presumed, without
tionship was itself
95
anything more.

1

NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE
It is this element of substantial certainty which distinguishes a
merely negligent act from intentionally tortious conduct. Nevertheless,
due care is still required." Where a defendant acts, despite his
knowledge that a risk is appreciable, his conduct is negligent. Where
the risk is great, his acts may be characterized as reckless or wanton,
but not intentional. 97 The actor must know or believe that harm is
193. Cf. Piedmont Cotton Mills, v. H. W. Ivey Constr. Co., 137 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1964); M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Liability for Procuring Breach of Contract, 26
A.L.R.2D 1227 (1952).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767, cmt. d (1979); Engine Specialties, Inc. v.
Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980) (holding that
specific intent to cause harm was not essential to establish the tort; only the intent to interfere with a known contract was required).
195. In appropriate cases where the conduct complained of may have been unlawful,
counsel may rely on the traditional view that a person must be presumed to intend the consequences of his unlawful conduct. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. H. W. Ivey Const. Co.,
137 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Inteference § 4 (1969).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298, cmt. a (1979) ("The word care denotes
not only the attention which is necessary to perceive change, but also the caution required to
avert it once it is perceived.").
197. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 7, at 36
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a substantially certain consequence of his act before an intent to
cause harm will be inferred.19 There was some doubt whether mere
negligence as opposed to intentional misconduct will sustain a cause
of action for interference with prospective pecuniary advantage."s
Comment (a) to § 766C highlights why liability is imposed for
economic loss when a defendant is guilty of intentional wrongful
conduct, and why courts have formulated a different rule where the
defendant is guilty of negligence only."° Comment (a) provides as
follows:
Liability for interference with contracts and prospective contractual
relations developed in the field of intentional torts. Sections 766,
766A and 766B all involve intentional torts. Thus far there has been
no general recognition of any liability for a negligent interference,
whether it is interference with the third person's performance of his
contract with the plaintiff (Cf. § 766), with the plaintiff's performance of his own contract (§ 766A) or with the plaintiff's acquisition of prospective contractual relations. (Cf. § 766B). The explanation usually given by the courts, when one is given at all, is that,
the harm is too "remote" for negligence liability and that the
defendant's conduct is not the "proximate cause." In most of the
cases in which recovery has been denied, the defendant has had no
knowledge of the contract or prospective relation and no reason to
foresee any harm to the plaintiff's interests; and the decision sometimes has been explained under the rule as to unforeseeable plaintiffs stated in § 281 .... 20'
Where the harm is foreseeable as it is in the hostile takeover arena,
negligent interference should be actionable.
People Express v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,"2 affirmed the
right to sue for damages caused by negligent interference with prospective economic advantage:
[A] defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to
avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical

(5th ed. 1984).
198. As a practical matter, the hostile takeover is well planned, and its implications thoroughly researched.
199. See e.g., Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1945)
(addressing the destruction of a bridge to an island, causing business loss to plaintiff).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C cmt. a (1979).
201. Id.
202. 495 A.2d 107 (NJ. 1985).
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injury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable
class with respect to whom defendant knows or has reason to know
are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct. A defendant
failing to adhere to this duty of care may be found liable for such
economic damages proximately caused by its breach of duty.2 3

In so doing, the Court expressly repudiated the fear of causal
line-drawing that has prevented so many other jurisdictions from
recognizing this tort.2°
Justice Handler began People Express by reminding us that the
common law routinely allows recovery of pecuniary losses in personal
injury cases (recovery for loss of earning capacity) and in property
damage cases (recovery for loss of use is allowed where a chattel is
damaged). 2°' He then sets forth the rationale of the virtually per se
Anglo-American rule which bars recovery for indirect economic losses
unless defendant's negligent misconduct also caused physical
harm.2" Abounding authority elucidated by Justice Handler supports
the per se no recovery rule. 0 7
Justice Handler makes it clear that the per se nonliability rule is
based primarily on a well grounded judicial fear of wide, unchecked,
open-ended liability for the economic repercussions of negligence (the
ripple effect). 208 He then states that the physical harm rule supports
only a limitation on, not a denial of, liability for indirect economic
losses.2" Justice Handler's People Express opinion fashioned a formula that limits liability but permits the allowance of meritorious
claims.2 10

203. People Express, 495 A.2d at 116.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 109.
206. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (indicating
that a ship's time charterer-lessee had no action for loss of the ship's use while it was laid
up for repairs caused by defendant's negligence); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B.
453 (1875) (denying recovery where defendant's negligence in allowing its pipes to leak
increased plaintiff's costs under a contract with a third to construct a tunnel); Barber Lines
A/S v. MV Donau Marce, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985) (determining that where a ship suffered extra labor, fuel, transport, and docking costs following an oil spill caused by defendant, there could be no recovery for such indirect pecuniary losses in the absence of physical
injury to plaintiffs on their property).
207. See Flemming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CF/. L. REV. 61 (1982).
208. People Express v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 110 (N.J. 1985).
209. Id. at 111.
210. Id.
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Justice Handler began his formulation of a rule allowing recovery
for indirect economic losses by carving a substantial number of exceptions to the general rule based on a "special relationship" between
the negligent tortfeasor and the individual or business whose economic interests were protected. 211 He found that a common thread ran
through these numerous cases giving them an underlying unity: All of
the successful plaintiffs were foreseeable with particularity, and virtually all of the foreseeable damages were both ascertainable and finite.212 In all these "special exception" cases the defendants knew or
reasonably should have foreseen that particular plaintiffs or an identifiable class of plaintiffs were at risk, and that ascertainable economic
damages would ensue from the conduct.213 The cases disentangled
and traced by Justice Handler imposed liability upon negligent accountants and auditors, surveyors, termite inspectors, engineers, attorneys, notaries public, architects, public weighers, and telegraph companies, all involving liability for indirect economic losses, despite the
absence of privity of contract between defendant professionals and
their victims who were foreseeable with some particularity.214
In all these cases, courts had found it fair, feasible and just to
impose liability on defendants who, by virtue of their special activities, professional training or employment, had special reason to know
that others, such as the intended beneficiaries of wills or purchasers
of stock who were expected to rely on the company's financial statement, would be economically harmed by negligent conduct. 215 Justice Handler makes clear that, although the particular plaintiff was not
always foreseeable, the particular type of injury was.216 In other
words, both the particular victim and the particular type of economic
harm were within the class of risk that antecedently makes the defen-

211. Id. at 112.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (noting that a lawyer is liable
to legatee for the loss of expectancy where lawyer drafts will violative of Rule Against Perpetuities); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Robert E. Pace, Negligent
Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of Common Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFoLK U. L. REV. 431 (1984) (discussing a negligent accountant's
liability to a non-privity plaintiff, who bought stock in a company, relying on an inaccurate
audit of company prepared by defendant, where the stock subsequently proved to be worthless).
216. People Express v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 113 (N.J. 1985).
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dant negligent.2 17 In this situation, as Justice Handler convincingly
demonstrates, the threat of limitless liability which may justify circumscribing the scope of duty does not apply, and his rationale recognizes the allowance of a remedy.218
Thus, People Express stands for the application of liability based
on negligence in any case where a balancing of such factors as foreseeability, closeness of connection, and moral blame on the decisionmaker warrant such a result.21 9 Several other jurisdictions currently
permit recovery for negligent infliction of economic loss using traditional negligence analysis. 220 In 1979, the California Supreme Court
held that the negligent infliction of economic loss was a valid cause
of action. 1 The Supreme Court of Montana followed suit in
2 In 1987, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the analysis of
19 8 2 .
the New Jersey Supreme Court and also held that a cause of action
would be allowed. 223 A federal district court has also imposed liability for negligent infliction of economic loss. 4
The Ninth Circuit permitted recovery for pure economic losses in
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen.225 In Oppen, the defendants' offshore oil

217. Id
218. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107,
at 747-48 (5th ed. 1984); William L. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19
VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966); Philip S. James, The Fallacies of Simpson v. Thomson, 34 MOD.
L. REV. 149, 155-62 (1971); Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation,37 MD.
L. REV. 286, 306-15 (1977).
219. People Express, 495 A.2d. 107. Accord, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal.
1979). The J'Aire court would also consider the extent to which the transaction was "intended" to effect the plaintiff, but this apparently does not require any intent to harm, only a
certainty that he would be affected. Other factors to be considered include certainty of harm
and policy of deterring future conduct. The court did not discuss damages as such. If the
only damages recoverable are for diminished value of the plaintiff's lease, the claim would
not be one for interference with prospects at all, but for interference with existing property
interests. If the damages are for loss of profits, as the court seemed to assume, the case is
one for interference with mere prospective advantage. This California decision was followed
in Hawthorne v. Kober Const. Co., Inc., 640 P.2d 467 (Mont 1982); Keel v. Titan Const.
Corp., 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1981).
220. The following are traditional elements of a cause of action for negligence: duty,
breach of the duty, proximate cause (including cause in fact) and actual loss. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
221. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
222. Hawthorne, 640 P.2d 467.
223. Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987).
224. Green Mountain Power Corp. v. General Elec. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 169 (D. Vt.
1980).
225. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
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well leaked crude oil into the Santa Barbara Channel.22 6 Local commercial fishermen sued to recover profits caused by the defendants'
negligent destruction of the Channel's supply of fish.227 The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action for
the lost profits.228 The Ninth Circuit stated that the imposition of
liability should depend on reasonable foreseeability. 229 Applying this
standard, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover lost
profits in this case.'
ABSENCE OF JUSTIFICATION

(i)

Introduction

There is no privilege to act unlawfully or contrary to good morals. 23' Under the RESTATEMENT liability for interference with existing or prospective contractual relations must be "improper. '232 The
RESTATEMENT2 33 lists a number of factors to be considered in determining whether interference is "improper":

§ 767. Factors in Determining Whether Interference is Improper

In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering
with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is
improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the
actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.' 3
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id.
Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859 (N.J. 1978).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
Id.
By and large, a growing number of jurisdictions are approaching the issue of wheth-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/3

42

Kanner: Protecting Workers from Unlawful Interference with Their Jobs
19921

Protecting Workers From Unlawful Interference With Their Jobs

With respect to subparagraph (a), the nature of the defendant's
conduct, the RESTATEMENT indicates a number of means by which
the defendant will ordinarily be regarded as having improperly interfered, which include:
(i)

Threats of physical violence;

(ii)

Fraudulent misrepresentations;

(iii)

Wrongful institution of litigation, civil or criminal;
and/or

(iv)

in violation of statutory provisions such as
Conduct235
antitrust.

his approach to "conduct" has generally been followed.236
Where the party has "an unlawful or improper purpose or uses
unlawful or improper means," it is actionable.237 The principles of
tortious interference are not self-applying, and each case must be
decided on its own facts.238 The ultimate factual inquiry must be
of generwhether the conduct was "both injurious and transgressive
2 39
law.
of
or
morality
common
of
standards
accepted
ally
This conclusion was reached by Justice Holmes in a related

er a defendant's interference is proper or improper through an analysis of the seven specific
factors set forth by the RESTATEMENT. See, e.g., Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d
1115, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); Gross v. Lowder Realty,
494 So.2d 590, 593-600 (Ala. 1986); Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24, 30 (Alaska
1980); Dawson v. Radewicz, 306 S.E.2d 171, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). See 45 AM. JUR. 2d
Interference § 27 (1969); Annotation, LIABILITY FOR PROCURING BREACH OF CONTRACT, 26
A.L.R.2d 1227, 1267 (1952).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
236. See, e.g., International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, 196 A. 474 (NJ. 1938) (discussing
threats or other intimidation); Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406
N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing deceit or misrepresentation); International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (discussing bribery); Glover v. Malloska, 213 N.W.
107 (Mich. 1927) (discussing a violation of statute).
237. Avtec Indus. Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 500 A.2d 712, 715 (N.J. 1985). See, W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 at 982-983 (5th
ed. 1984). The types of "improper means" prohibited include such conduct as fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, obstruction and molestation. Avtec Indus., 500 A.2d at 715; see also
Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. v. Townecraft Indus., Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 135, 141-45 (Ch. 1962)
(stating that as long as a party does not use wrongful or improper means, it may persuade
an employee to change jobs if its purpose is at least in part to advance its own interest in
competing).
238. Avtec Indus., 500 A.2d at 715.
239. Id. at 716.
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context in one of his early cases, where the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court approved an injunction prohibiting a union
from employing any "scheme or conspiracy" whatever to bring pressure on other workmen to keep them from entering the employment.2' Justice Holmes would have enjoined them only from using
violence or threats of violence:
[I]n numberless instances the law warrants the intentional infliction
of temporal damage because it regards it as justified .... The true

grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody
disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswerable
proof. They require a special training to enable any one even to
form an intelligent opinion about them. In the early stages of law,
at least, they generally are acted on rather as inarticulate instincts
than as definite ideas for which a rational defense is ready ....
[l]t has been the law for centuries that a man may set up a business
in a country town too small to support more than one, although he
expects and intends thereby to ruin someone already there, and
succeeds in his intent .... The reason, of course, is that the doc-

trine generally has been accepted that free competition is worth
more to society than it costs, and that on this ground the infliction
of the damage is privileged .... If the policy on which our law is

founded is too narrowly expressed in the term free competition, we
may substitute free struggle for life .... Combination on the one

side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a
fair and equal way." 2 1
In the modem context where our definitions of property and
liberty includes a worker's expectancy, and the raider is under a duty
to act within the law and within generally accepted standards of morality, the jury must determine how to protect not only property rights
but to protect the social order under which these rights have come
into conflict. Thus, workers suing in a modem tortious interference
case need only show that the interfering third party wrongfully and
without justification interfered with an expectancy of economic bene-

240.
241.

Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896).
Id. at 105-08.
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24 2

(ii) Proof of Wrongfulness
In the hostile takeover area, workers will generally allege some
violation of the securities law,24 3 although other wrongs may be
pled. 2' This predicate will satisfy the conduct requirement. There is
no further need to show malice. 245 Since "[j]ustification connotes
just, lawful excuse, it excludes malice... [which] may be inferred
from the absence of just cause or excuse." 24
The raider's motive is generally to make the quick buck "devil take the hindmost." A raider knows that the proposed "diversification by takeover" publicized to the media is a fabrication merely
designed to conceal a "bust up" and is destined to fail. The business
warns against efforts at diversification through
literature 24consistently
7
takeover.

242. Borbely v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959, 976 (D.N.J. 1981).
243. E.g., The Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)). As a result, Congress added
§§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
244. The action may have been wrongful as an ultra vires act. E.g., Robtham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 53 A. 842 (N.J. 1903) (enjoining the corporate purchase of stock in another
company where the purchase was not for purpose of making an investment but for the carrying out of an improper corporate scheme, entrenching managements power); Hill v. Nisbet,
100 Ind. 341, 349 (1885) (stating that "[w]hether the purchase of stock in one corporation by
another is ultra vires or not, must depend upon the purpose for which the purchase was
made"); Dittman v. Distilling Co. of Am., 54 A. 570 (N.J. Ch. 1903); Ellerman v. Chicago
Junction Ry., 23 A. 287 (NJ. 1891).
245. E.g., Sustick v. Slatina, 137 A.2d 54, 60 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1957). See, e.g.,
W.E. Ormsby, Malice in the Law of Torts, 8 LAW Q. REv. 140 (1892). "At frst denoting
hatred or personal ill-will, it [malice] loses by degrees its original meaning, till at least it
reaches its vanishing point in its identification with 'intention' and 'knowledge'." Id. at 149.
246. Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 67 (N.J. 1934) (citing Wendelken v. Stone,
86 A. 376 (N.J. 1913)). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766, cmt. m. (1977). See
also Henderson, Malicious Motives as a Ground of Action, 13 JURIs. REV. 452, 461 (1901)
(noting that the result of the English interference decisions between 1881 and 1901 demonstrates that "[t]he conception of legal malice . . . mean[s] little more than mere intention).
Whether or not malice for punitive damage purposes is present is a question of fact. Louis
Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 72 A.2d 197, 203 (N.J. 1950).
247. E.g., Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, 87
HARv. Bus. REv. 43 (1987) (reporting the track record of 33 large U.S. companies' diversification efforts over the period of 1950-1986). Stated simply, that record is "dismal." Id.
Where the company entered an unrelated line of business by acquisition prior to 1975, 74.4%
of the acquisitions were subsequently divested. Id. at 51. Where entry was by start-up, the
acquisition was subsequently divested 40.9% of the time. ld. Finally, where entry was by
joint venture, the acquisition was subsequently divested 48.9% of the time. Id. at 50. The
stunningly poor reports by Porter are consistent with those reported by Ravenscraft and
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The wrong tends to void any privilege of action.248 Various
courts have found certain harmful activities to be privileged.2 49
These activities, even though they may interfere with a prospective or
existing contract, cannot be legally deemed tortious activities.250 Every one is at liberty to earn his living in his own way provided he
commits no wrong, such as violating some law or prohibition, or infringing the rights of other people. Protection of workers' and
unions', indeed any citizens', right to be free of improper interference
with their reasonable economic expectancies embodies an important
public policy. 251 Occasionally, however, that public policy conflicts
with a counter-policy in favor of business competition. In these situations the courts may recognize a qualified privilege or immunity, but
limited to situations where there is no wrongful act:
If the act complained of does not rest upon some legitimate interest
[i.e., a proper end], or if there is sharp dealing or overreaching, or
other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly situated [i.e.,

an improper
means] the ensuing loss to the plaintiff should be re252
dressed.
Limited privileges such as the right to engage in competitive economic activity while recognized by the courts2 53 disintegrate where the

Scherer for conglomerate acquisitions during an overlapping period based on Federal Trade
Commission Working Paper No. 136. DAvID RAVENSCRAFr & FREDERICK SCHERER, MERGERS
AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE (Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission Working
Paper No. 137, Jan. 1986).
248. E.g., BEUDANT, LE DRorr INDIVIDUEL Er L'tTAT 148 (1891) ('Every rule of law in
itself is an evil, for it can only have for its object the regulation of the exercise of rights
and to limit the exercise of a right is inevitably to limit it."); ARNDTS, JURISTISCHE
ENCYKLOPADM § 12 (2d ed. 1850) (indicating that the "[1]aw exists for the sake of liberty . ...
It exists to protect liberty in that it limits arbitrary will . .
").
249. For example, under Colorado law, any interference with a corporation's contracts by
officers, directors, or employees of the corporation who in good faith serve the corporate
interest, is privileged. Zappa v. Seiver, 706 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1985); Q.E.R., Inc. v.
H-ickerson, 880 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1989); Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d
716, 726 (Colo. 1985). This privilege is not absolute, and like the other privileges must be
balanced with the factors listed in § 767 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS.
250. Id
251. See, e.g., Brennan v. United Hatters of N. Am., 65 A. 165, 171 (N.J. 1906):
"In a civilized community which recognizes the right of private property among its
institutions, the notion is intolerable that a man should be protected by the law in
the enjoyment of property, once it is acquired, but left unprotected by the law in
his efforts to acquire it."
Id; see also, NEW JERSEY PATTERN CIVIL INSTRUCTION No. 3.18(A).
252. See NEW JERSEY PATrERN CIVIL INSTRUCTION No. 3.18(A) (emphasis added).
253. In some instances, if an actor acts with a competitive purpose in causing the breach
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217

assertedly privileged actor employs wrongful means in the course of
his activity.'
Interference with prospective economic advantage is actionable,
"unless the defendants are acting in the exercise of equal or superior
right." 5 This is the raider's privilege. In order to determine if what
the defendant has done is actionable, i.e., not done in the exercise of
equal or superior right, the ultimate inquiry is whether the conduct
was "both injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards
of common morality or of law.''256 We must ask, if the interference
by the defendant was "sanctioned by the rules of the game. 25 7
of existing or prospective contracts, then these actions may be privileged and non-tortious.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768 (1977). E.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v.
Blue Cross, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989). Ocean State brought suit against Blue
Cross for unlawfully excluding Ocean State from the health care insurance market. Id.at
1104. Both Ocean State and Blue Cross contracted with physicians to provide medical care to
each carrier's subscribers. Il at 1103. Ocean State offered more coverages with lower premiums than Blue Cross and, therefore, grew more rapidly. I& Blue Cross fell into financial
difficulty and began offering coverages very similar to Ocean State. Il Ocean State brought
suit, alleging in one count Blue Cross's actions of mimicking the terms of Ocean State's
coverages interfered with Ocean State's contracts with its customers. Il at 1104. Both the
trial court and the First Circuit found in favor of Blue Cross.
See, e.g., Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enters., 308 A.2d 477, 482 (R.I. 1973). The
Court found that Blue Cross's actions were justified under the competition privilege:
[C]onduct in furtherance of business competition is generally held to justify interference with others' contracts, so long as the conduct involves neither wrongful
means nor wrongful restraint of trade.
Ocean State at 1113. Thus, if the interference is intentional, but done through legal and competitive purposes then the interference in not necessarily actionable.
Particularly where contracts are terminable at will, the privilege of competition is recognized. In Warde v. Kaiser, 887 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1989), the court conditioned the competition privilege on whether the contract expressly stated it was terminable at will. Because the
contract interfered with in warde was terminable at will, the competition privilege defeated
the tortious interference claim. Warde, 887 F.2d at 102.
254. Harris v. Perl, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768
cmt. i (1977). For example, there is no competitive privilege where the interference caused or
created an unlawful restraint of trade. HJ., Inc. v. IT&T, 867 F.2d 1531 (8th Cir. 1989)
(applying Minnesota interference law). A company that attempted to create a monopoly was
not shielded by the competition privilege. The defendant company attempted to monopolize
the hoist business by selling hoists below cost and inducing buyers to break contracts with
other hoist sellers. Because of the actor's unlawful monopolizing purpose, the resulting contractual interference was improper. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover as damages the
present value of its profits which were lost as a result of the improper actions. Moreover, the
court allowed a punitive damage award to stand for the defendant's willful indifference to
another's right to compete in the marketplace.
255. Sustick v. Slatina, 137 A.2d 54, 59 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1957).
256. Sustick, 137 A.2d at 60; DiCristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 128 A.2d 281,
287 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1957).
257. Sustick 137 A.2d at 60. Trautwein v. Harbeurt, 123 A.2d 30, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1956).
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There can be no tighter test of liability in this area than that of the
common conception of what is right under the circumstances. 258
According to Leslie Blau Co. v. Alferi, 259 if the alleged tort
was committed out of sheer malice, the tortfeasor will be liable on
that account. 21 If the tortfeasor acted out of a motivation to enhance his financial position, then it is necessary for recovery that his
conduct must have been transgressive of generally accepted standards
of morality, i.e., a violation of standards of socially acceptable
conduct.261 The law affords protection of the business entrepreneur
against wrongful acts of third parties, not against fair and legitimate
competition.2 62
(iii) Role of The Jury
The jury decides the merits of that contention. The jury serves
an important function in defining notions of "wrongfulness."26' 3 The
generality of the concept is what enables law to develop in an orderly
manner in light of changed circumstance consistent with fundamental
principles of right.2"
This jury and community morals emphasis was clearly expressed
in the review of prior case law in Glass Molders, Pottery, Plastics
and Allied Workers International Union v. Wickes C0.265:

258. Sustick, 137 A.2d at 60.
259. 384 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
260. Id. at 867.
261. Good morals is an excellent vehicle for a jury evaluating the wrongfulness vel non
of a tortfeasor's interference with contract. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(f), 78(k) (1988) (addressing "fair dealing," "just and equitable principles of
trade," and "maintenance of fair and orderly marketr).
262. Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859, 865 (N.J. 1978).
263. See Glass Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. Wickers Cos.,
707 F. Supp. 174 (D.NJ. 1989).
264. Cf., E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Ci. L. REV. 666, 676 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102
cmt. 1) (1963) ("[p]art of the strength of such general concepts as 'good faith' and 'commercial reasonableness' lies in an elasticity and lack of precision" that permits [their development] . . . 'in the fight of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.'"); RESTATIMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977)
(imposing general duty of good faith, but not a duty of fair dealing).
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) defines good faith merely as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) imposes on merchants only the higher standard of good faith of "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1977).
265. 707 F. Supp. 174 (D.NJ. 1989).
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In Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 137 A.2d 54 (App. Div.
1957) the Appellate Division noted that:
[A] degree of generality in the criteria which will suffice to spell
out liability in any given case of this kind is unavoidable. The
essence of the cases in this field is that in adjudging whether
what the defendant has done is actionable, i.e., not done in the
exercise of an equal or superior right, the ultimate inquiry is
whether the conduct was "both injurious and transgressive of
generally accepted standards of common morality or of law." . . .
In other words, was the interference by defendant "sanctioned by
the 'rules of the game.'" . . . There can be no tighter test of
liability in this area than that of the common conception of what
is right and just dealing under the circumstances.
48 N.J. Super. at 144, 137 A.2d 54 [citation omitted]. And in Fitt
v. Schneidewind Realty Corp., 81 N.J. Super. 497, 504, 196 A.2d 26
(Law Div. 1963) the court defined a "wrongful act" for the purposes of establishing liability for tortious interference as:
one which in the ordinary course of events will infringe upon the
rights of another to his damage, or one which is done with the
purpose of benefiting the acting party at the other's expense and
is not done in the exercise of an equal or superior right. The
mere doing of an act which is damaging to another and to the
actor's benefit is wrongful and not within the "rules of the
game."
As these passages indicate, the tort is defined in exceedingly broad
terms, and the parameters of wrongful conduct may range far. We
therefore think it theoretically possible for the plaintiffs in this case
to assemble the elements of tortious interference without proving
that Wickes violated the enumerated securities laws. Thus, the alleged transgressions of the Williams and Hart-Scott-Rodino Acts
cannot be considered "necessary" elements of plaintiffs' state tort
claim."
CAUSATION
An essential element of the proof of a cause of action in tort is

266. Id at 179-80.
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that there be some reasonable connection between an act or omission
of the defendant and the damage the plaintiff has suffered.2 67 Since
the law has generally rejected the outmoded epistemological and
logical model of a single definable cause and a direct, immediate and
determinate effect that suffices to prove causation, and adopted instead the substantial factor test.2 6' The test acknowledges the fact
that in the usual course, "[an] event without millions of causes is
simply inconceivable; and the mere fact of causation, as distinguished
from the nature and degree of the causal connection, can provide no
clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally
responsible." '69
Although our law requires proof of cause to recover in tort, it
does not require proof of a single cause. The substantial factor standard ascribes liability to a cause which has played a part in the production of the harm, even though the harm may have occurred absent
that cause. This standard is particularly suited to the injuries here.
More important, the part played by a cause in producing a harm is a
question for the jury, which must determine whether that cause had
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to
regard it as a cause.270 This evaluation of substantial factors is both
factual and legal,2 7' and is intertwined with duty, breach of duty
and proximate cause. 2"
Accordingly, "[c]ertainty of economic advantage need not be
shown; reasonable probability of that advantage, absent interference,
suffices."2' 73 In such cases there is a background of business experience on the basis of which it is possible to estimate with some fair
amount of success both the value of what has been lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it, if the defendant
would have not interfered. The loss of prospective profits is, for
example, a familiar element of damages in cases of breach of con-

267. KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, § 41 at 263.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, cmt. a (1965).
269. KEETON ET AL, supra note 79, § 41 at 266.
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 432 (1965).
271. KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at § 41; see Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation, 40 SW. L.J. 909, 952
(1986).
272. David Howarth, Causation and The Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1389, 1419 (1987); Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and The Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven Jr., 43 U.
CI. L. REV. 69, 72 (1975); see, Elam v. Alcolac, Inc. 765 S.W.2d 42, 176 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988).
273. Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1409 (1985).
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tract.
More important, proximate causation is a question of fact for the
jury to determine 74 whether the defendant has played a material
and substantial part in causing the plaintiff's loss of the perspective
economic advantage. 5 The case law is clear that where an act by a
third party is intentionally brought about the defendant's inducement
or action, or where such third party conduct is even a part of the
foreseeable risk which the defendant has created, the result is well
'
within the limits of "proximate causation."276
Legal cause and proximate cause are synonymous.2" Conduct
is a legal cause of injury if it is "a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm."'
Section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts lists various criteria to determine whether conduct is a legal
cause of harm. 9
In order for a plaintiff to collect damages for unlawful interference with economic advantage, it must be reasonably probable that,
without the Raiders' alleged misconduct, some workers would have
realized the economic advantage."' This should not be difficult to
prove, given the actual loss incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the
attempted takeover.
RESULTING HARM

No one realistically denies that workers lose jobs and wages, and
that unions lose dues, as a result of the series of post-takeover events
triggered by the Raider. The only question is whether the raider's

274. Causation judgments often reflect moral judgments about conduct. H.L.A. HART &
ANTHONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN LAW 260-76 (1959); Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE LJ. 238, 259 (1950).
275. Doremus v. Hennessy, 52 N.E. 924 (Ill. 1898), reh'g denied, 54 N.E. 524, (Ill.
1898); Chipley v. Atkinson, 1 So. 934 (Fla. 1887); Kock v. Burgess, 156 N.W. 174 (Iowa
1916), reh'g denied, 158 N.W. 534; cf, Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 147 N.W. 32 (Wis.
1914).
276. See, e.g., Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. Exeter Boot & Shoe Co., 159 F. 824 (1st
Cir. 1908); Doremus, 52 N.E. at 926; Heath v. American Book Co., 97 F. 533 (D. W. Va.
1899).
277. Latta v. Caulfield, 398 A.2d 91, 93 (NJ. 1979) (holding superseded by statute as
stated in Renz v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 435 A.2d 540 (N.J. 1981)).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1964); Latta, 398 A.2d 91; Miehl v.
Darpino, 238 A.2d 203 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 247 A.2d 878

(N.J. 1968).
279.
280.

Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaners & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 249 A.2d 382 (N.J. 1969).
Myers v. Arcadio, Inc., 180 A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962).
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involvement is too causally remote.28
Foreseeability and causation, however, usually follow a standard
track. First, the Raider puts the Target "in play," with a junk bond
takeover attempt:
Once a company was put "in play" by an initial bid - even a
shakily financed bid by some entrepreneurial upstart - the dynamics of the situation dictated that it would probably end up being
taken over by somebody, because the directors and managers of the
target, being bound to represent the interest of their stockholders,
faced legal and moral difficulties if they refused without explanation
an offer well above the market price of the stock. 82
Once in play, the Target often responds by opposing the takeover
attempt. 283 This is generally viewed as proper.2 4 The law does
not allow the board to remain passive, in the face of a bad bid, or an

281. The Raider need not know which specific workers would be hurt. Courts have allowed recovery where plaintiff has shown just "some" or "only a small proportion" of a
group at risk were similarly affected without specifically defining this number as a given percentage. Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23
Sw. L.i. 256, 294-95 (1969) (referring to Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 19 N.E.2d 697
(Mass. 1939)); Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 52 A.2d 666 (N.J. 1947); Zirpola v. Adam
Hat Stores, 4 A.2d 73 (NJ. 1939); Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers Involved in Use of a Product, 1967 WASH. U. L.Q. 206, 219 (referring to Gober v. Revlon,
Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963); Wright v. Carter Prod. Inc. 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957);
Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 136 A.2d
626 (NJ. 1957); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior CL, 268 P.2d 199 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1954). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 218, § 93 at 669.
282. JOHN BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 20 (1987); see TAN at 92.
283. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955, n.10 (Del. 1985)
(noting that '[i]t
has been suggested that a board's response to a takeover threat should be a
passive one . . . [But] as the proponents of this rule of passivity readily concede, it has not
been adopted either by courts or state legislatures").
284. In ruling on the legality of defensive tactics, the courts have been sympathetic to the
possibility of shareholder losses resulting from coercive bids. In the early cases, the prevailing
rule was that management must have some business purpose in undertaking any defensive
move; in the absence of such a purpose, an active defense using corporate resources could be
viewed only as an effort by management to entrench itself. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that the plaintiff must show that the sole or primary
motive of defendant managers was to retain control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). An
adequate business purpose includes the offered price was too low. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). More recently, the courts have ruled that the propriety of takeover defenses should be judged against the
threat posed by the hostile bid and, recognizing the distinctive dangers of partial and two-tier
offers, have held some tactics to be legal that a few years ago probably would have been
viewed as unquestionably abusive. See generally Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding, under the "enhanced" business judgment rule, the adoption of a
poison pill).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/3

52

Kanner: Protecting Workers from Unlawful Interference with Their Jobs
1992]

Protecting Workers From Unlawful Interference With Their Jobs

inept bidder.285 Indeed, the courts have established an affirmative
"duty of directors to evaluate proposed business combinations on their
merits and oppose those detrimental to the well-being of the corporation even if that is at the expense of the short term interests of individual shareholders."286
Not only is the fact of resistance often foreseeable, but so is the
means of resistance. By now, the idea that a company best defends
against a takeover by anticipating and implementing what would have
been an acquirer's post-acquisition plans for the business is standard
strategy, well recognized, and accepted in the literature.287
As the raid is occurring, the reality of risk to the Target's workers is acknowledged by the Raider in the course of its suit against
Target's management or in SEC filings. Raiders often acknowledge in
SEC filings that it might fire workers upon gaining control of the
Target. At that point, and based on prior knowledge in the field of
takeovers, the resulting consequences are undoubtedly foreseeable to
the Raider.

288

This foreseeability is based on both the Raider's knowledge and
that of its agents. It is hardly surprising to contend that takeover
are aware of the consequence of tender offers on emprofessionals
9
ployees.

28

The Raider, or its agents, usually know that whether there is a
successful takeover, or a successful defense against the takeover by
the Target buying up its own stock and/or paying greenmail, directly
or indirectly, the resulting operating company would end up with a

285. E.g., Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Once
[the board] determined that a Care [Corp.] takeover would be detrimental to [the target]
Treadway, it was . . . reasonable that the directors should move to oppose it.").
286. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981). See also Gulf W. Indus. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d. Cir.
1973).
287. E.g., William E. Fruhan, Corporate Raiders: Head'em off at Value Gap, 66 HARV.
Bus. REV. 63 (July-Aug. 1988); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (indicating that the result of T. Boone Pickens' efforts to acquire Unocal in a highly
leveraged acquisition was that Unocal management ended up imitating Pickens' acquisition
strategy by causing the company to itself borrow substantial funds and pay them out to
shareholders).
288. Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Cal. 1985) (concluding that
Pickens' Mesa Partners II "from the outset intended to put Unocal 'in play' and thereby
either obtain control or 'greenmail' the corporation in exchange for dropping its bid").
289. E-g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985) (noting that
Household's attorneys explained to the directors "the possible adverse effect this type of activity could have on employees and others concerned with, and vital to, the continuing successful operation of Household even in the absence of any actual bust-up takeover attempt").
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greatly increased debt burden, which in fact usually happens." °
The Raider or its agents, usually know that the resulting indebted
operating company, with an increased debt service burden that has to
be met, will have to discontinue or sell off even profitable operations
under a recapitalization plan.2 9' In fact, the Target is often warned
by the Raider after the raid to recapitalize or be subject to another
takeover attempt. That threat, plus the legal obligation of management
to put shareholder interests over those of workers, means one foreseeable thing - recapitalization.2"
The RESTATEMENT only limits a defendant's liability when the
causal linkage between the negligence and the resulting harm is, when
viewed in retrospect, "highly extraordinary: [T]he actor's conduct may
be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the
event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about
the harm. 293
This section was drafted to deal with scientifically improbable
"Rube Goldberg" causal sequences, situations which Prosser characterized as "the remarkable, the preposterous, the highly unlikely, in the
language of the street the cock-eyed and far-fetched, even when we
look at the event, as we must, after it has occurred."" 4
Courts applying the hindsight test of Section 435(2)29 s in the
manner Prosser describes, clearly indicate that the exemption from
liability supplied by Section 435(2) is to be sparingly invoked.2"
Although many courts embrace the substantial factor test embodied in

290. Increased debt "is a preemptive factor in corporate cash flow and may limit management flexibility." HENRY KAUFMAN, INTEREST RATES, THE MARKETS, AND THE NEW FINANCIAL WORLD 69-70 (1985).
291. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 54-57 (1986).
292. Id. As Professor Coffee reports, "[u]ndoubtedly, the hottest buzzwords in the executive suite over the last several years have been 'financial restructuring' and
'deconglomeration' . . . . One recent study reports that 23% of the nation's leading 850
corporations have indergone an 'operational restructuring' since the beginning of [1985],
usually selling or spinning off divisions." Id. at 52-54, citing, V.R. Buzzotta, A Quiet Crisis
in the Work Place, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1985, at A27, col. 2.
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1979).
294. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 268-69 (4th ed. 1971)
(referring to Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928)).
295. Id,
296. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 375 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Wis. 1979) (noting
that the causal link between a motorist's negligence while striking the tree, while "somewhat
attenuated," presented a jury issue).
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225

Section 435(1), (which allows liability without foresecability of the
extent of harm and manner of occurrence), they have not considered
the chain of causation in any case otherwise meeting the substantial
factor test to be so attenuated as to require the application of Section
435(2).29

Prosser instructs that negligence is judged looking forward, proximate cause looking back.291 Section 435(2), consistent with this,2 99
explicitly calls for an objective hindsight look taken with full knowledge of all that has happened, not from the actor's viewpoint which
is limited by the knowledge the tortfeasor had at the time."°o
As a simple matter of the meaning of words, there is nothing
attenuated or "highly extraordinary" about the causal linkage suggested here. The company that becomes the target of a tender offer seldom remains independent." 1 There was no intervening cause, no

297. With respect to Massachusetts law, e.g., Rae v. Air-Speed Inc., 435 N.E.2d 628
(Mass. 1982) (indicating that harm to the plaintiff is traceable to insurance agent's failure to
procure worker's compensation insurance for plaintiff's employer not extraordinary within
meaning of § 435); Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 1980) (noting that
an elderly driver accelerated instead of braking, causing another driver to swerve and hit an
electric pole, which fell and hit a pedestrian. The flimsy design of the pole was held to be a
substantial factor in causing injury to the pedestrian (§ 435(1); no mention was made of
§ 435(2)).
298. KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 268-69.
299. Comment c of § 435(2) of the RESTATEMENT articulates the critical issues: "whether
the duty imposed on the actor was designed to protect the one harmed from the risk of harm
from the hazard in question." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) cmt. c (1977).
300. See generally Pastore v. Taiyo Gyogyo, K.K., 571 F.2d 777, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1978)
(indicating that stevedore's employee caused a fire by careless smoking; hence the subsequent
injury to a fireman slipping on a ladder while putting out the fire was not highly extraordinary in hindsight); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 561 (3d Cir.
1966) (reversing the verdict for the defendant because trial judge failed to apply hindsight
test to intervening cause: "[i]t may be that a particular defendant is unaware of the facts that
led to events giving rise to the intervening act, yet the jury, viewing the matter retrospectively, could properly conclude that the act was not extraordinary."); Hall v. Atchinson, Topeka
and Sante Fe Ry., 504 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1974) (giving a directed verdict for railroad where
the improper, negligent blockage of crossing prevented motorist from reaching hospital for
emergency treatment); Kaukonen v. AMo, 298 P.2d 611 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (noting a
nonsuit on the opening was an error where the defendant carelessly selected a travel route
exposed to landslides); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 430 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 1980) (suggesting
that it is not extraordinary that a delusional patient would wedge head between mattress and
wall: "[u]nusual or bizarre results can become a factor on the question of proximate cause,
but only when with the benefit of hindsight it appears highly extraordinary that the actor's
negligent conduct should have brought about the plaintiff's injury").
301. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1149 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulating Market Control] (noting only 20-25% of target
companies remain independent following an initial tender offer); David W. Leebron, Games
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Palsgrafian sequence, no cock-eyed, far-fetched, preposterous sort of
occurrence with which section 435(2) deals, hence no basis for holding that the Raider's decision to put the target in play was not the
"legal" or "proximate" cause of the loss of jobs: [t]he active efficient
cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result
without the intervention of any force started and working actively
from a 2new and independent source is the direct and proximate
3
cause."
TARGET'S PREEXISTING CONDITION

A wrongful act is the legal cause of resultant harm, even though
after occurring causes, such as something arising from preexisting
condition,0 3 may have joined in producing the final result, provided
the defendant's negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about the total disability. 3° 4 Economic injury operating on a Target's
previously impaired corporate organism renders the Raider who
caused injury liable for damages for the whole resulting disability of
the Target notwithstanding the fact that the impairment
is greater than
305
condition.
previous
the
for
been
have
it would
INTERVENG AND SUPERSEDING CAUSES

Whether the Target or others had the latitude to react in various
ways is a question of fact to be determined under the circumstances.
It is difficult to imagine true choice, and thus any sort of a "superseding cause" as has been suggested by some Raiders. However,

Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 195 n.144 (1986)

(reviewing empirical evidence on the results of tender offers).
302. Wolfe v. Checker Taxi Co., 12 N.E.2d 849, 850 (Mass. 1938) (stating that the decedent, a policeman, was sitting in his squad car when defendant's speeding taxi struck a nearby pushcart forcing it into the squad car. Decedent bit his tongue as a result of the collision;
the wound became infected and caused his death. Held that it need not be foreseeable that a
particular person is hurt or that an injury would result in any one particular manner: "[t]he
connection between the negligence and the impact, . . .was uninterrupted and direct.").
303. Where there are two distinct events separated by an appreciable period of time, the
finding as to whether, or what portion of, the injuries are indivisible is properly left to the
jury. Ouagliato v. Bodner, 278 A.2d 500 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971).
304. Bello v. Commissioners of Dep't of Labor & Indus., 256 A.2d 63, (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.), rev'd, 264 A.2d 222, (N.J. 1969).
305. Green v. Buch Bras Co., 236 A.2d 605, (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd 236 A.2d
885 (NJ. 1967); Amarn v. Stratton, 506 A.2d 1225, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985);
Self v. Starr-Davis Co., 187 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
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under applicable precedent, a tortfeasor is not relieved of liability by
the intervening or superseding acts of a third party if those acts are
reasonably foreseeable."re
With respect to the impact of the Raider's actions on the
Target's workers, the Raider will blame the Target's management, and
label them a superseding and intervening cause. As indicated above,
if the Target's response was a foreseeable consequence of what the
Raider initiated, the Raider is responsible.
The "causation" requirement cannot be resolved as a matter of
law." 7 The courts invariably hold that causation is a fact question
for the jury, i.e., whether the defendant has played a material and
substantial part in causing the plaintiff's loss of the prospective economic advantage? °"
At trial, the relevance of the Target's action, might at most be
on the issue of apportionment. The RESTATEMENT, however, makes
clear that matters of apportionment of harm3° are for the jury to
decide:

(1) It is the function of the court to determine

(a)

whether the evidence as to the facts makes
an issue upon which the jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of
the defendant has been a substantial factor

(b)
(c)

in causing harm to the plaintiff;
whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more
causes; and
the questions of causation and apportion-

306. Menth v. Breeze Corp., 73 A.2d 183,
307. Latta v. Caulfield, 398 A.2d 91, 93
proximate cause are synonymous, however the
stated in Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 435 A.2d
308.
309.

189-90 (N.J. 1950).
(N.J. 1979) (suggesting that legal cause and
ultimate holding was superseded by statute as
540 (N.J. 1981)).

See id
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A Apportionment of Harm to Causes:

(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a)
(b)

there are distinct harms, or
there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to be a single harm.

(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
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ment, in any case in which the jury may
not reasonably differ.
(2) It is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in
which it may reasonably differ on the issue,
(a) whether the defendant's conduct has been
a substantial factor in causing the harm to
the plaintiff, and
(b) the apportionment
of the harm to two or
310
more causes

The burden of proof lies with the defendant who seeks to mitigate his responsibility by alleging the causal impact of another:

(1) Except as stated in subsections (2) and (3), the burden of
proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant has
caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has
combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or
more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the
ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among
them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is
upon each such actor.
(3)

Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and
it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by
only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to
prove that he has not caused the harm."'

Without discovery on a motion to dismiss, it would be improper
to suggest an absence of causation or foreseeability. For example,
would the Raider have launched the takeover attempt without first
determining what "defenses" the Target had in place,312 and what

310. Id at § 434 (Functions of Court and Jury).

311. Id at § 433B (Burden of Proof).
312. C.f., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986) (indicating that a board of directors has the power to adopt a "poison pill" defense in
response to a hostile takeover bid).
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options would the Target have had available to it? What options
would the Raider have had? Of course not, that is why Raiders pay
investment bankers so much money. In any event, these are issues of
fact, not questions of law.
CAUSATION - BLAMING TARGET MANAGEMENT AND THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

The target of a hostile takeover generally may not, as a matter
of state corporate law, favor its non-shareholder constituencies worker, community, etc. - over its shareholders in any activity."'
The Delaware Supreme Court seems to have foreclosed such a preference for non-shareholder interests when it observed:

A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided that there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders.314

The contrary thesis that managers of target companies should
acquiesce when confronted with a tender offer has not been adopted
by courts and legislatures. 315 Courts have generally gone in the opposite direction, holding that directors have not only the right but also
the duty to resist tender offers that they believe to not be in the best
interests of their shareholders.3 6 Although some decisions find particular defensive tactics to be unlawful,317 they are exceptions to the
general rule permitting or even requiring defensive strategies. 8
This sense that decisions regarding the future of the corporation
are best made by its managers is embodied in the business judgment

313. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
314. Id
315. Denying managers the right to resist hostile tender offer denies shareholders the
opportunity to bargain effectively with the acquirer. David Haddock et al., Property Rights in
Assets and Resistance To Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 721 n.49 (1987).
316. See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951
(1980); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev'd in part, 490 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
317. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Podesta v. Calumet Indus.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,433-34 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Condee Corp.
v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
318. Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
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rule.319 Relying on the business judgment rule, courts typically have
held that the target's management has the right, and even the duty, to
oppose a tender offer it determines to be contrary to the firm's best
interests.32 Commentators generally have applauded the results of
these cases.2'
The reaction of shareholders to managerial resistance depends on
the outcome. Few protest when resistance leads to a takeover at a
higher price. When resistance thwarts the takeover attempt altogether,
however, litigation usually follows. Although defeat of the takeover
attempt may deprive the target's shareholders of a substantial premium, shareholders' suits against management to recover this loss are
almost always unsuccessful. 3' The great majority of public corporations have not adopted "porcupine" provisions making acquisitions
more difficult, and principles of fiduciary duty restrict managers' options to do so.'
FORESEEABLE

ACTIoNS BY TARGET

Courts have also recognized the special nature of the bust-up
takeover and hinted
that they may justify defensive tactics not other324
appropriate.
wise

319.
320.

Id
Eg., Panter, 486 F. Supp. 1168.

321. See, e.g., Leo Herzel et al., Why Corporate DirectorsHave a Right to Resist Tender
Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101 (1979); William H. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the
Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs L. REv. 882 (1978); LIPTON & STEBEROER, supra,

note 51. Other authors, although skeptical about the motivation for resistance, would allow
defensive tactics in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Richard L. Gelfond & Steven B.

Sebastain, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 403 (1980); Gary C. Lynch & Marc L Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tac-

tics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
322.

See Herzel, supra note 321.

323. Numerous courts have recognized that managers' attempts to keep themselves in
control breaches their fiduciary duty. See, eg., Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d
906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (holding that managers may not change proxy election rules if the
changes entrenches them in office); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. Ch. 1964); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). Supporters of defensive action against tender
offers repeatedly counsel managers not be candid about their objectives, lest candor will lead
to a finding of violation of fiduciary responsibilities. Preparation of a 'black book' of procedures to be used in the event of a takeover attempt is not desirable because it may be used
to embarrass management in litigation by creating a 'credibility gap' for a management that
states it has acted in good faith and carefully considered a raider's offer. E.g., LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 51.
324. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 n.4 (Del. 1985); Revlon,
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What are the management's alternatives when confronted with a
hostile takeover situation? In the effort to preserve its independence
while at the same time maximizing shareholder value, management
typically begins by seeking a "white knight" and/or evaluating its
potential for executing a defensive recapitalization [leveraged buyout,
leveraged recapitalization, leveraged employee stock option (ESOP)
financing, or stock repurchase program]. Price is a key consideration, as statistics show that management's ability to control the
outcome of these situations depends on its ability to outbid the
hostile raider. In 1987 there were 31 contested public takeovers, 52
percent of which the hostile raider won by outbidding management
and/or other interested parties. In 26 percent of these transactions, a
white knight outbid the hostile raider, while in only 13 percent of
the transactions, management succeeded in execiting a defensive
recapitalization by topping the hostile raider's final price.
These statistics illustrate that once a company is put into play as a
result of a hostile bid, it is virtually certain to undergo a drastic
change in terms of its capital structure, strategy, and, perhaps, management, notwithstanding any antitakeover measures that the company may have adopted. While management is not always able to
thwart the raider's attempted takeover bid, it can be instrumental in
raising the price ultimately paid for the company's shares through
the introduction of other bids, including its own defensive recapitalization.32
ALTHOUGH WORKERS NEED NOT SHOW A CAUSAL CONNECTION
BETWEEN THEIR HARM AND THE RAIDERS' VIOLATION OF LAW OR
GOOD MORALS, SUCH A CONNECTION USUALLY EXISTS
Unlawful delays in disclosure make a difference in the success of
a takeover attempt.326 The Williams Act's disclosure requirements
create a balance between bidder and target, i.e., they make a differ32 7
ence in the outcome of a takeover fight.

Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 180, 181 n.12 (Del. 1986); see
also, supra note 284.
325. CAPrrMAN & WINFIELD, EVALUATING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES IN CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 68-69 (M.L. Rock & R.H. Rock ed. 1990).

326. C.f, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) ("The time constraints and rush of events which occur when a company is 'in play' dictate quick response by the board of a target company.").
327. Gregg A. Jarrel & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 372 (1980).
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The advantage to a hostile bidder from delaying 'disclosure of its
actual intention appears starkly from the data concerning the impact
on the price of target company stock when a SEC Schedule 13D is
filed. If the SEC Schedule 13D states that the purchase is only for
investment, target stock earns positive abnormal returns increase to
7.74%.328 By down-playing (or failing to entirely disclose) its intentions, the acquirer limits the rise in the price of the target's stock,
thereby minimizing the price at which additional shares can be purchased by it in the period between the SEC Schedule 13D filing and
the subsequent tender offer. This lower purchase price generates larger
profits later at the time of sale.
The data also shows that an even greater advantage can be secured if the acquirer does not file a SEC Schedule 13D at all. Then,
so long as its buying is done carefully, the price of the target's stock
may not rise at all. The practice of attempting to avoid filing a SEC
Schedule 13D by having someone else purchase shares on the
329
acquirer's behalf has come to be known as "parking.
What is interesting about parking is the standards governing its
legality - Rule 13d-3's definition of "beneficial ownership" as having voting or investment power held "directly or indirectly, through
any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise" is
broad enough to pick up any parking arrangement. Thus, the rules
governing disclosures in takeovers make a difference to bidders who,
or which, seek what is essentially greenmail.33 °
THE INTERFACE OF TORT AND SEcuRITIES LAW
The doctrine of federal preemption emanates from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution:

328.

Mikkelson & Ruback, Corporate Investment in Common Stock (Sloan School of

Management Working Paper No. 1633-85, Table 4, Feb. 1985).
329. The antitrust laws exist, in part, to protect workers and communities. International
Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930). See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d
592, 607 (6th Cir. 1970) (acknowledging the legitimacy of these interests in the United
States); Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
18,797,
18,864 (FTC 1969) (giving substantial weight to the interests of employees, their
families, and the affected community). As to the weight given similar interests in other context, see United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aft d, 405
U.S. 562 (1972).
330. Disclosure provisions of the Williams Act forced raiders "to pay substantially more
for their corporate acquisitions . . . The federal and state regulations each cause [an additional] statistically significant increase in the average premiums paid to the shareholders of
the target firms." Jarrell, supra note 327, at 373.
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State shall be

bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State
3 31
to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Federal law may preempt state common law as well as statutes and

regulations. 32
Absent an explicit indication of Congressional intent to preempt

state law, a state statute or rule of law is preempted only:
where compliance with federal and state law is a physical impossibility... or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objective of
333
Congress.

here is an "over-riding presumption that 'Congress did not intend to
displace state law.'

3

1

Preemption of inconsistent state law by fed-

eral law is disfavored in the absence of persuasive reasons; the burden of showing that Congress' intent to preclude the states from
providing 33
traditional
state law remedies for its citizens rests with the
5
defendant.

No "persuasive reasons" for implying preemption exist, especially
since the Williams Act contains no explicit indicia of Congressional
attempt at preemption.336 On the contrary, the securities law contains an express savings clause designed to save state tort laws from
preemption.337 According to 15 U.S.C. § 78bb:

331. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
332. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co. v. Kalo Erish & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311
(1981); San Diego Bldg Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
333. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). See also Capital Cities
Cable Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984).
334. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
335. Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)).
336. Thomas L. Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77, 97 (1988).
337. For descriptions and commentary on the role of the states in regulating takeovers,
see id; Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Limitation: Interest, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court
and the Politics of Corporate Takeover: A Comment on CTS Corp. of America, 101 HARV.
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(a)Addition of rights and remedies: Recovery of Actual Damages;
State Securities Commissions.
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law
or in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess
of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. Nothing
in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder .... 338
In Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,339 the
Court recognized the impact of this anti-preemption clause in finding
that a state anti-takeover law was not preempted by the Williams
Act.' Moreover, the anti-takeover statute at issue in Amanda Acquisitions works a greater and qualitatively more profound incursions
on defendants' supposed preempted field than the cause of action
articulated in a worker's tortious interference suit.34 The Wisconsin
statute at issue in Amanda Acquisitions compels a hostile acquiror to
wait for three years after buying its shares before (a) merging with
the target or (b) acquiring or otherwise disposing of or encumbering
the target's assets.' Such a law would virtually eliminate hostile
takeovers by leveraged buyout. 43 Despite this virtual elimination of
hostile tender offers, the Wisconsin statute was held not preempted by
the Williams Act. ' Observing that the "best argument" for preemption is the Williams Act's supposed "neutrality" between bidder and
management, the Amanda court refused to elevate an arguable absence of Congressional hostility to takeovers, into a Congressional di-

L. REV. 96 (1987); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 W. VA.
L. REV. 111 (1987).
338. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1988).
339. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
340. Id
341. Id at 502-505.
342. Amanda Acquisitions, 877 F.2d at 497-98.
343. "As a practical matter, Wisconsin prohibits any offer contingent on a merger between
bidder and target, a condition attached to about 90% of contemporary tender offers." Id. at

499.
344. Id. at 504-05.
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rective to states not to adopt more hostile regulations:
To say that Congress wanted to be neutral between bidder and
target is a conclusion reached in many of the Court's opinions, e.g.,
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 926, 51
L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) - is not to say that it also forbade the states
to favor one of these sides. Every law has a stopping point, likely
one selected because of a belief that it would be unwise (for now,
maybe forever) to do more. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.
522, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 1393-94, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987);
Covalt v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1439 (7th Cir. 1988).
Nothing in the Williams Act says that the federal compromise
among bidders, targets' managers, and investors is the only permissible one. See Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State AntiTakeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and
Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 74, 71-74. Like the majority of
the court in CTS, however, we stop short of the precipice. 481 U.S.
at 78-87, 107 S.Ct. at 1643-49. 345
The courts have then recognized preemption in three distinct
circumstances. First, Congress may include express pre-exemption
Second, a federal statute or regulation
language in the statute.'
may occupy a given field in a manner which is "sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room'
Congress' intent to occupy a
for supplementary state regulations."'
given field may be inferred from the pervasiveness of the federal
regulatory scheme, from the dominance of the federal interest, or
from the objectives of and obligations imposed by federal law. 34 '
Finally, a state law may actually conflict with a federal statute and
thus create "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the

345.

Id. at 503. See Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 609 F. Supp.

1055 (D. Md. 1985). In Nunes, a group of investors brought suit alleging that a broker vio-

lated federal securities laws, state securities laws and was liable for common law claims of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and breach of contract. Id The court held that
the plaintiffs could recover punitive damages in a pendent-common law claim in a federal
securities action, even though punitive damages are not available in actions brought for violations of federal securities laws. Id at 1060-61. Thus, while federal law may have "struck the
balance" between brokers and customers short of providing for punitive damages, that does
not mean that the states cannot publish the same broker conduct more harshly, i.e., strike a
different balance between brokers' rights and their customers' rights. Id
346. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1977).
347. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
348. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Questa, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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full purposes and objectives of Congress." 9 A conflict exists only
when a state law interferes with the goals of the federal statute or the
regulatory methodology for accomplishment of the goals.350
Securities laws and regulations do not purport to preempt tortious
interference litigations, 351 or any other tort remedy 52 Title 15,

349. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
350. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 491-92 (1987).
351. See supra note 11; Cf., supra note 8.
352. This lack of preemptive intent is evident in the fraudulent conveyance area, which
has given rise to significant developments, especially in bankruptcy relating to leveraged
buyout (LBO) transactions. In United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987) (also known as Gleneagles case), the controlling shareholders of the debtor corporation
solicited a purchaser for the debtor corporations' shares. Id The purchaser/holding company
acquired the debtor corporation by borrowing (through the debtor corporation) the necessary
funds form a third party, securing the loan with mortgages on the debtor corporation's assets.
Id The loan proceeds went from the lender to the debtor corporation, and were subsequently
turned over to the shareholders in exchange for their tendered shares. Id Shortly after the
transaction was closed, the debtor corporation found itself in bankruptcy. Id
The Third Circuit declined an opportunity to hold the fraudulent conveyance laws inapplicable to LBO transactions, and the Court concluded that the mortgages granted to the
lender by the debtor corporation were fraudulent conveyances within the Fraudulent Conveyance Act as enacted in Pennsylvania. Id The Third Circuit took note of the fact that all of
the major parties involved (lender, debtor, and purchaser) had knowledge of the intended application of the loan proceeds as a result of their participation in the LBO negotiations. Id.
In addition, although the LBO involved a number of transactions (loan from lender to purchaser-formed holding company which passed through debtor corporation, debtor-corporation's
grant of mortgages to lender, payment by purchaser to stockholder for debtor's corporation's
stock), the Third Circuit integrated the transactions upon the finding that the debtor corporation was a mere conduit in a single integral transaction. I As integrated, the transaction was
simple: the buyer used the debtor's assets to borrow the money to pay the shareholders. Id.
The debtor received no benefit from the borrowing and, indeed, was left insolvent when the
dust settled. Id
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988), was before the
court on motions to dismiss certain fraudulent conveyance claims arising out of a similar
structure as presented in the Gleneagles case. Id There the court made an extensive review
of law and fact before declining the actions with respect to the directors and controlling
shareholders of the debtor corporation as well as the lender that provided the LBO financing.
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288. The court in Weboldt Stores, relying on
Gleneagles and other authority, stated that the point of inquiry should not be the formal
structure of the transaction, but rather, the court should focus on the knowledge and intent of
the parties involved in the transaction. Wieboldt Stores, 94 B.R. 488. In this case the directors, controlling shareholders and lenders all participated in the negotiations and had actual
knowledge of details relating to the debtor corporation and the LBO including legal advice
regarding fraudulent conveyances, which was disregarded. Id, The court concluded that this
knowledge and intent would require collapsing the various transactions into one transaction
with respect to the parties that participated in the transaction. Id The court, however, declined to collapse with respect to non-controlling shareholders, and dismissed the claims
against them as no knowledge or intent was alleged. Id It was said that these shareholders
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U.S.C. Section 78bb(a) expressly provides53 that nothing in the 1934
Act will affect state law causes of action:
Preemption has not won easy acceptance among the Justices for
several reasons. First there is § 28(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a), which provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect
the jurisdiction of the securities commission.., of any State over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions
of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunS
34

der.

[Wihatever doubts of the Williams' Act preemptive intent we might
entertain as an original matter are stifled by the weight of precedent." 794 F.2d at 762. The rough treatment our views received
from the Court - only Justice White supported the holding on preemption - lifts the "weight of precedent".
There is a big difference between what Congress enacts and what it
supposes will ensue. Expectations about the consequences of a law
are not themselves law. To say that Congress wanted to be neutral
between bidder and target - a conclusion reached in many of the
Court's opinions, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S.
1 (1977)... - is not to say that it also forbade the states to favor
one of these sides.355
were "innocent pawn" whose only participation was the tendering of their shares in response
to a tender offer. Al
353. "Persons injured in securities transactions are frequently able to choose among (and

under modem alternative pleading to combine) a substantial number of private rights of action. They may be grouped into three categories - (a) actions that common law or in equity, (b) actions, express and implied, under the state blue sky laws, and (c) actions, express
and implied, under the federal securities statutes." L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURIES
REGULATION 1007 (1983).

Similarly, Section 6 of the Clayton Act makes clear why the Sherman Act does not
preempt labor law or employment contract disputes. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) ("The labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."); Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321
F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The same argument might apply to securities laws unless
there is some "evidence that the SEC has authorized or even condoned the alleged practices
upon which this action is based." Id. at 605 nl. Obviously, such approval is impossible,
since the typical case is predicted on the violation of these laws.
354. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir.
1989).
355. Id. at 503. See id. at 505 ("Although Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970), sometimes is understood to authorize such general-purpose balancing, a closer examination of the cases may support the conclusion that the Court has looked for discrimination
rather than baleful effects."); Champion Parts, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 878 F.2d 1003,
1006 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that a claim that was made in a tort action was preempted by
the Williams Act; the Court did not delve into the merits of this contention but noted that
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"was plainly intendThe Supreme Court has stated that this provision
35 6
ed to protect rather than limit state authority.
As the Amanda Court points out, the Wisconsin statute would
certainly make takeover attempts less likely, but it would not "alter
any of the procedures governed by federal regulation. 35 7 Simply
making takeover attempts less attractive does not conflict with the
Williams Act, because the Williams Act only regulates the procedures
of a takeover, but has not created a right either to engage in takeover activity nor a right by shareholders to benefit from such activity:
Any bidder complying with federal law is free to acquire shares of
Wisconsin firms on schedule. Delay in completing a second-stage
merger (that the Wisconsin Act mandates) may make the target less
attractive, and thus depress the price offered or even lead to an
absence of bids; it does not, however, alter any of the procedures
governed by federal regulation ....
Only if the Williams Act gives investors a right to be the beneficiary of offers could Wisconsin's law run afoul of the federal rule.
No such entitlement can be mined out of the Williams Act, however.
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2458,
86 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), holds that the cancellation of a pending offer
because of machinations between bidder and target does not deprive
investors of their due under the Williams Act. The Court treated
§ 14(e) as disclosure law, so that investors could make informed
decisions; it follows that events leading bidders to cease their quest
do not conflict with the Williams Act any more than a state law
leading a firm not to issue new securities could conflict with the
Securities Act of 1933. See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d
192 (2d Cir. 1980), both holding that the evaporation of an opportunity to tender one's shares when a defensive tactic leads the bidder
to withdraw the invitation does not violate the Williams Act. Investors have no right to receive tender offers. More to the point -

the argument was probably without merit).
356. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979). For an interesting discussion of the savings clause, see, Note, Securities, Law and the Constitution: State Tender
Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.L 510, 579 (1979). The Supreme Court trilogy commonly referred to as the Blue Sky Cases, recognizes the traditional state regulatory role in
securities matters, despite commerce clause attacks. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W.
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
357. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 504.
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since Amanda sues as bidder rather than as investor seeking to sell
the Williams Act does not create a right to profitfrom the business of making tender offers. It is not attractive to put bids on the
table for Wisconsin corporations, but because Wisconsin leaves the
process alone once a bidder appears, its law may co-exist with the
Williams Act. 8
Ultimately, a raider can argue little more than that the present
cause of action would discourage tender offerors - just as
Wisconsin's non-preempted law would - because it might raise their
cost.359 Even assuming the truth of this assertion, it yields not a
scintilla of justification for preemption. For this "deterrent effect"
tampers not at all with the takeover procedures governed by federal
regulation.3" Only if Wickes asserts a purported "right" to engage
in takeovers, or posits a shareholders' "right to be the beneficiary of
takeovers" can any tension whatsoever be discerned. 361 The Amanda
Acquisition court observed, "the Williams Act does not
create a right
362
to profit from the business of making tender offers."
More important, "a state law is preempted only if Congress not
only struck its own balance but also precluded the states from striking
any other." 363 As the Court in Amanda held:
There is a big difference between what Congress enacts and what it
supposes will ensure. Expectations about the consequences of a law
are not themselves law. To say that Congress wanted to be neutral
between bidder and target - a conclusion reached in many of the
Court's opinions, e.g., Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc., 430 U.S.
1 (1977) - is not to say that it also forbade the states to favor one
of these sides.'
Thus, the Supreme Court in CTS found an Indiana law regulating
takeovers not preempted by the Williams Act, even though the Indiana law in CTS gravely disadvantages the bidder and significantly
aides management to the point of possibly eliminating takeovers.
Thus, "CTS unmistakably teaches that states have a legitimate interest

358. Id. at 504-05 (emphasis added).
359. Id. at 504.
360. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 504.
361. Id.

362. Id at 504-05.
363. See From MITE to CM5: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, The Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading" SuP. Cr. REV. 73 (1987).
364. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 503.
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in regulating tender offers, despite the significant influence such regulation has over the transfer of securities and the so-called market for
corporate control." 3' In BNS, the court held that a state may regulate hostile takeovers as long as it does not totally eliminate them:
The plaintiff argues that a substantial alteration of the balance between management and the offeror conflicts with the Williams Act.
The fair import of the cases, however, is that even statutes with
substantialdeterrent effects on tender offers do not circumvent Williams Act goals, so long as hostile offers which are beneficial to
target shareholders have a meaningful opportunityfor success.36
Further evidence of this intent not to preempt can be seen in the
Court's unwillingness to imply a federal private cause of action for
violation of SEC filing laws.367
Finally, "[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the
statue that way."368 The Supreme Court today rejects judicial rewriting of federal laws to imply rights. 69 Also, there is no legislative
history to support preemption. Even if such legislative history existed,
it is not a substitute for plain meaning of a federal statute.370
DAMAGES
The dominant image projected by current tort doctrine is that of
a system comnnitted to the ideal of individualized justice. Indeed, this
commitment finds its source and strongest expression in the damage
award, where the general norms of liability are tailored to the specific
loss involved. To this end, painstaking concern is evinced for the
particular plaintiff "as found" and for making that person

365.
366.
367.

BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 468-69 (D. Del. 1988).
Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 US.. 560, 578 (1979).

368. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989).
369. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted
legislative intent."); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 (1989) (rejecting attempts to narrow the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act to
organized crime context where the statutory language does not support the same).
370. See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, (1989); United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, L, concurring in part) ("[I]t must be assumed that
the Members of the House and Senators thought what they were voting for, and what the
President thought he was approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly said,
rather than what a few Representatives, or even a Committee Report, said it said.").
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"whole." 37'
Under the RESTATEMENT 3" the following compensatory damages are recoverable:
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the
contract or the prospective relation;
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be expected
to result from the interferences.
(2) In any action for interference with a contract by inducing
or causing a third person to break the contract with the
other, the fact that the third person is liable for breach
does not affect the amount of damages awardable against
the actor; but any damages in fact paid by the third person will reduce the damages actually recoverable on the
judgement 3
(a)

Damages, in interference cases, should include lost wages374
and damages at least equal to the defendant's gain acquired because
of the interference.375 After that, the computation would turn on
whether the defendant acted negligently or intentionally.3 76 Under
the negligence standard, damages are limited to those which are
"proximate" to the injury about which complaint is made, i.e., analogous to damages in negligence actions.3" This may include dam-

371. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 n.9 (1986);
SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 3380, 424-27 (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, Fourth
Series 1953) (referring to Prosser, The Borderland Between Tort and Contract).
372. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1977).
373. IX
374. With respect to factoring in inflation in wages over the future, there must be sufficient evidence to support this regarding inflationary trends. McGill v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 464 F.2d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1972); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 14344 (3d Cir. 1973). In other words, you need a sufficient economic basis for future projections.

375. Jerry Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts - Tortious Interference, 23
DRAKE L. REV. 341, 355-56 (1974).
376. See Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 634 P.2d 1333, 1334-35 (Or. 1981); Lake
Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 461 A.2d 725, 729-30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
377. See ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Records, 374 F.2d 455, 460-62 (5th Cir.
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ages for emotional distress associated with such losses.378 Under the
intentional tort standard, recovery is allowed for unseen expenses,
mental suffering and damage to reputation, in addition to punitive
damages. 379 Foreseeability and certainty, concepts that generally
protect the wrongdoer, are of much less importance in the case of an
intentional wrong.380
]EQUITABLE RELIEF

The plaintiff may have the remedy of an injunction to enjoin the
defendant from interfering with an existing business relationship or
expectancy."' The general rules governing the propriety of equitable
relief are applicable in interference with prospective advantage ac32
tions. 8
PUNmVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages may also be awarded in intentional interference
cases. 383 The applicable factors are set forth under state law. Generally, this requires either a reckless indifference"' or an evil
1967); Gentile Bros. Corp. v. Rowena Homes, 227 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Mass. 1967); Duane
Jones Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1967); Shell Oil Co. v. State Tire & Oil, 126
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1942). See also 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 58 (stating the measure of
damage equals the loss caused by the interference) (1969).
378. Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 634 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Or. 1981) (noting that
mental anguish recovery is allowed); see Gould v. Kramer, 149 N.E. 142, 144 (Mass. 1925);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Millionas, 89 So. 732, 738 (Ala. 1921); Doucette v.
Sallinger, 117 N.E. 897, 899 (Mass. 1917); Carter v. Oster, 112 S.W. 995, 999-1000 (Mo.
CL App. 1908).
379. Lake Shore Investors v. Rite Aid Corp., 461 A.2d 725, 730 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1983) (adopting intentional tort method).
380. Although a plaintiff can generally only recover damages for losses that are proved
with "reasonable certainty," RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981), "[d]oubts
are generally resolved against the party in breach," and "[a] court may take into account all
the circumstances of the breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser
degree of certainty.- Id. § 352 cmt a. See also L.L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1937) (stating that in cases
of willful breach the uncertainty principle "seems not to be taken seriously" (footnote omitted)).
381. See Louis Kamm, Inc v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 68 (N.J. 1934); Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1186 (1978).
382. Id
383. See, e.g., Guillory v. Godfrey, 286 P.2d 474 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Wade v.
Culp, 23 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. App. 1939); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.W. 371 (Iowa
1910).
384. See, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (suggesting that in defa-
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intent." Given the presence of the same, however, a raider cannot
be heard to complain about being held accountable for more remote
causal consequences. 86 Although greed is more evil than good, despite Mr. Boesky's contrary protestations," 7 the calculated nature of
the raider's activity combined with an awareness of the likely consequences as set forth, inter alia, in various SEC filings, are important
factors to warrant the condemnation of society for the raider's volitional action. 88 Any antecedent law violations, especially willful
"parking" violations, adds further support to an award of punitive
89
damages.
CONCLUSION

New forms of commerce - some mergers and acquisitions when stripped to their simple essence show the inescapable violence
being done to workers throughout the Nation, as well as the economy
as a whole. This violence results from intentional acts and choices. In
many cases, this intentional activity is coupled with criminal misconduct. The challenge is for the trial bar and organized labor to work
together to vindicate the rights of these workers. As Dean Pound

mation cases, "'actual malice' is a term of art, created to provide a convenient shorthand expression for the standard of liability that must be established before a State may constitutionally permit public officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers. As such,
it is quite different from the common-law standard of 'malice' generally required under state
tort law to support an award of punitive damages.").
385. See, e.g., Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257
(D.N.J. 1987) ("The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently reiterated the requirements for
recovery of punitive damages. 'To warrant a punitive award, the defendant's conduct must
have been wantonly reckless or malicious. There must be an intentional wrongdoing in the
sense of an 'evil minded act' or an act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of
the rights of another.'" (citing, Nappe v. Anschelevitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d
1224, 1230 (N.J. 1984))); accord Enright v. Lebow, 493 A.2d 1288, 1297-98 (N.J. Super CL
App. Div. 1985). Cf, Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(awarding punitive damages where groundwater contamination resulted from leading underground storage tanks); Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988) (awarding
punitive damages where defendants' "actions [demonstrated] an entire want of care [raising]
the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences").
386. EFg., Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1985)
(noting that a "company which creates the Frankenstein monster of abnormally dangerous
waste should not expect to be relieved of accountability for the depredations of its creature
merely because the company entrusts the monster's care to another, even to an independent
contractor.").
387. CoNNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL (1988).
388. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 16.
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wisely said, a professional acts in "[p]ursuit of [a] learned art in the
spirit of a public service."39

390.

Rosco POUND, THE LAW FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
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